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INTRODUCTION
The American law of church and state is in the midst of a
significant transformation. In the area of government funding
for religious organizations, the Supreme Court has moved from
a rule that generally disallowed direct government funding of
churches to a rule that requires it in certain circumstances.1 In
relation to government religious expression, the Court has suggested that regulating sectarian speech in public settings might
violate free exercise rights when previously it had held that the
Establishment Clause limits government speech.2 And, in the
context of religious accommodations, the Court for the first time
extended the right of free exercise to for-profit corporations.3 So,
too, the Court for the first time invalidated application of a civil
rights law to a for-profit business,4 raising significant questions
about whether religious exemptions might be used to undermine
decades of precedent governing equal access to the market.5
The most immediate cause of these legal developments is
the changing composition of the Supreme Court.6 Coinciding
1. See Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of
the Establishment Clause, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 723–30 (2002); Douglas Laycock, Churches, Playgrounds, Government Dollars—and Schools?, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 133 (2017); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Trinity Lutheran Church v.
Comer: Paradigm Lost?, in AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, SUPREME COURT REVIEW
2016–2017, at 131 (2017). Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606–07
(1971) (finding statutes that provide financial support to religious schools unconstitutional), with Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2025
(2017) (allowing a church to receive public benefits).
2. Compare Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074
(2019) (holding that using a cross in a WWI memorial on public land is constitutional), and Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (holding that
a town beginning board meetings with a prayer is not a violation of the Constitution), with McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 851, 881 (2005)
(holding that the display of the Ten Commandments in a courthouse violates
the Constitution when the purpose for hanging them is religious).
3. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
4. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719 (2018).
5. See Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus,
132 HARV. L. REV. 133, 154 (2018); Melissa Murray, Consequential Sex: #MeToo,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, and Private Sexual Regulation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 825,
831–34 (2019); Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
1453 (2015).
6. Justice O’Connor’s retirement and replacement by Justice Alito has
moved the Court’s Religion Clause doctrine visibly to the right. Unlike Justice
O’Connor, Justice Alito has never voted to limit government support for religion
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with recent judicial appointments, however, is an emerging intellectual and ideological critique of the twentieth century
church-state settlement. We call this critique religious antiliberalism. We argue that the Court’s Religion Clause jurisprudence
has begun to reflect certain aspects of this critique, that the
twentieth century church-state settlement is unstable, and that
antiliberal views are likely to influence the development of legal
doctrine going forward.
The history of antiliberalism can be traced to counter-Enlightenment reactions to the emergence of liberal political theory
and liberal institutions, especially in the aftermath of the French
Revolution.7 But the more recent rise of populist and authoritarian regimes worldwide has coincided with renewed criticisms of
liberalism, especially from religious conservatives.8 To be sure,
scholars and partisans on both the left and the right have long

under the Establishment Clause, see Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1831 (Alito,
J., concurring) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to legislative prayer
practice); Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2011) (dismissing case for lack of taxpayer standing to challenge tax credits for violating
establishment clause); Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587,
592–93 (2007) (restricting taxpayer standing to raise Establishment Clause
challenges), and, until this Term, he never voted to reject a religious exemption
claim, see Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(joining Justice Gorsuch’s opinion that would grant free exercise challenge to
application of state public accommodations law); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853,
859 (2015) (granting Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act exemption from prison grooming policy); Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 688–91 (granting exemption under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to for-profit corporation from contraception mandate); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 198–99 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)
(grounding the ministerial exception to antidiscrimination law in the Religion
Clauses). But see Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661, 661 (2019) (mem.) (rejecting a
Muslim prisoner’s Establishment Clause challenge to Alabama’s practice of allowing a Christian chaplain to administer last rites within an execution chamber but prohibiting Islamic clergy from doing the same).
Justice Kennedy’s retirement and replacement with Justice Kavanaugh
will also likely contribute to the growing alignment of Religion Clause doctrine
with the views of social conservatives, which has been a long-term goal of a vocal
faction within the Republican Party. See Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel,
Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics,
124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2544–52 (2015) (discussing political mobilization by religious conservatives within the Republican Party).
7. See generally STEPHEN HOLMES, THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM
(1993) (discussing the origins and history of antiliberal political thought).
8. See infra Part II.
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berated liberalism for its supposed failures. For Marxist and socialist critics, classical liberalism stands for the exploitative
market economy with its emphasis on individual property rights:
the invisible hand of Adam Smith turned into the industrial
economy. Its neoliberal variant is criticized for causing massive
economic inequality.9 For non-Marxist critics, the rise of liberalism is blamed for the decline of religion, the fraying of traditional
morality, the rejection of communal ties, the epidemic of social
alienation, the obsession with materialism and consumerism,
and the rise of modern statism with its inevitable collapse into
fascism or communism.10
Liberalism is often ill-defined. Most critics agree, however,
that liberalism is a political, economic, and social theory of personal autonomy, rights (property and otherwise), a distinction
between public and private spheres, religious toleration (if not
religious neutrality), and the rejection of rule based on inherited
authority and tradition. John Locke, Adam Smith, James Madison, Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill feature prominently
within the liberal tradition.11 John Rawls is the most important
twentieth-century liberal philosopher.12
Antiliberalism is a comprehensive critique. It is not restricted to any one area of law, politics, or society. In this Article,
however, we examine the confluence of antiliberal thought and
the changing face of church-state jurisprudence, where religious
9. See, e.g., WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S
STEALTH REVOLUTION 28–29 (2015); THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 237–70 (Arthur Goldhanner trans., President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. 2014) (2013); David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 20–21 (2014).
10. See, e.g., PATRICK J. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED (2018);
RYSZARD LEGUTKO, THE DEMON IN DEMOCRACY: TOTALITARIAN TEMPTATIONS
IN FREE SOCIETIES (2016); STEVEN D. SMITH, PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS IN THE
CITY: CULTURE WARS FROM THE TIBER TO THE POTOMAC (2018).
11. See JOHN GRAY, LIBERALISM (1986); ALAN RYAN, THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM (2012); Jeremy Waldron, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, 37 PHIL. Q. 127 (1987); Gerald Gaus et al., Liberalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 22, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/
liberalism/ [https://perma.cc/2VLZ-TAFF].
12. See Samuel Freeman, Introduction to THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
RAWLS 1 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003); Jon Mandle & David A. Reidy, Introduction to A COMPANION TO RAWLS 1 (Jon Mandle & David A. Reidy eds., 2014).
See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE]; JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (expanded ed. 2005)
[hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM].
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antiliberalism might naturally find a home. Antiliberal thought
has a long pedigree, and our main purpose here is neither to recover nor to critique it, but rather to show how certain forms of
criticism inspired by it might be relied upon to justify shifts in
the doctrine of church and state. That doctrine has become more
favorable toward religion, especially Christianity, at least with
respect to winners and losers in the Supreme Court.
Our focus here is on the revival of non-Marxist, religious antiliberalism. These critics of liberalism tend to use language that
suggests that liberalism acts as an agent—that it is responsible
for bringing about changes in policy and institutions. Antiliberals often make causal claims about what liberalism has wrought,
but, as Cass Sunstein has recently observed, liberalism is a set
of ideas, not an agent.13 The same is true of antiliberalism. Thus,
our focus is mainly conceptual and normative, rather than
causal. Our claim is that certain political and legal changes can
be understood in terms of antiliberal ideas, not that those ideas
caused the relevant changes.
If antiliberal thought does not provide a causal explanation
for recent political and legal developments, it can nevertheless
serve to justify those developments. In relation to the law of
church and state, the new antiliberalism’s doctrinal goals are often consistent with the goals of many religious conservatives
more generally, including broad autonomy for religious institutions and persons through religious exemptions from general
laws; public funding of churches and religious organizations
through vouchers or direct grants; acceptance of majoritarian
public religious expression and displays, including in some cases,
a return to school prayer; and the legitimacy of state-enforced
moral codes based on religious principles.14
Some of these changes in legal doctrine can be interpreted
and defended under liberal principles.15 A liberal political order
13. See Cass R. Sunstein, Ismism, Or Has Liberalism Ruined Everything?
6 (Harvard Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 19-19, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3372364 (“[L]iberalism is not a person or an agent.
It is a constellation of ideas.”).
14. See SMITH, supra note 10, at 267–82, 304–33; STEVEN D. SMITH, THE
RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 142–58 (2014).
15. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 201–04 (2007) (giving a qualified defense of equal funding of religious organizations under a liberal egalitarian theory); IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, AND
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is compatible with a range of permissible church-state relations,
including regimes that provide legal exemptions for conscientious objectors16 and funding on equal terms for religious
groups.17 For that reason, we expect that church-state adjudication will continue to be dominated by principles of fairness, neutrality, and equality. The current Court has not rejected the language of liberalism, at least not rhetorically.18
Nevertheless, we argue that the application of liberal principles—including non-discrimination, religious neutrality, and
requirements of private choice—is under significant stress.
While particular doctrines governing religious exemptions, state
funding, or government speech might be justifiable along liberal
lines, the overall pattern and trajectory of the emerging churchstate legal regime conflicts with liberal values and commitments. There is an inescapable sense that even bedrock principles—that government cannot favor one religion above others,
for instance19—are subject to revision in light of criticisms that
arise from a very different intellectual tradition. For that reason,
the future of the Court’s church-state jurisprudence is in question. What will the doctrine look like in the coming decades? Re-

RELIGIOUS PEOPLE 54–61 (2014) (justifying the ministerial exception for religious organizations on the basis of the secular state’s incompetence to decide
ecclesiastical questions); Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 347–49 (1996) (defending religious exemptions
and equal funding on grounds of religious neutrality).
16. With respect to religious exemptions, one of us has argued that a regime
that also extends exemptions to nonreligious claims of conscience can be defended on liberal grounds. Micah Schwartzman, Religion as a Legal Proxy, 51
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1085, 1099–101 (2014); see also CÉCILE LABORDE, LIBERALISM’S RELIGION 34–35, 203–25 (2017); cf. NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE 76–77 (2017) (arguing constitutional law requires, in
some situations, religious exemptions to be extended to nonreligious actors to
preserve equality). But exemptions for religious and conscientious objectors
must be limited so that they do not impose significant burdens on third parties.
Micah Schwartzman et al., The Costs of Conscience, 106 KY. L.J. 781 (2017–18).
17. See Cécile Laborde, Political Liberalism and Religion: On Separation
and Establishment, 21 J. POL. PHIL. 67, 67 (2013) (arguing that political liberalism, at least in its received form, is indeterminate about many controversies
involving separation and disestablishment).
18. See infra Part III.
19. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005); see also
Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, the
Ten Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 NW. U.
L. REV. 1097, 1119–20 (2006).
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ligious antiliberalism gives us a clue, for it seems to be an ascendant voice, in part because of the Court’s increasingly conservative trajectory.
This Article makes three contributions: theoretical, doctrinal, and political. First, it describes four strands of religious antiliberalism. Some versions may be compatible with disestablishment, though others are frank in their advocacy of a religious
state. All share a deep distrust of the Court’s twentieth century
church-state settlement.20 Second, the Article discusses the conceptual incoherence of the Court’s contemporary church-state
doctrine, with special attention to the Court’s recent cases involving the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. We argue
that the critique of liberalism provides resources to a newly conservative court seeking to remake constitutional doctrine. Antiliberal thinkers are explicit about this project, and their critiques are often directed at the Court. Third, the Article
considers the future of church-state separation as a matter of
political economy. The global critique of liberalism is gaining
traction as liberal democratic regimes around the world are under threat from populist and reactionary forces, including in the
United States.21 We argue that the fact of American religious
pluralism—which is commonly invoked as the guarantor of disestablishment—will not halt the political and doctrinal momentum toward Christian preferentialism.
Part I sets the stage by describing the basic contours of a
liberal account of church and state. Such an account relies on a
distinction between religious and secular law and demands state
neutrality among religious denominations and between believers and non-believers. For many readers, these liberal commitments will be familiar, though how they have been applied in
specific legal controversies has always been contentious.
Part II then introduces the critics, tracing the antiliberal
tradition in church and state, with specific focus on recent commentary pertinent to the law of religious freedom. A recurring
theme in antiliberalism’s revival is that liberalism is a “religion”

20. See infra Part II.
21. See ROGER EATWELL & MATTHEW GOODWIN, NATIONAL POPULISM: THE
REVOLT AGAINST LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2018); WILLIAM A. GALSTON, ANTI-PLURALISM: THE POPULIST THREAT TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2018); JAN-WERNER
MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 50–60 (2016).
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that generates its own orthodoxy.22 On this account, disputes
over the Religion Clauses do not pit religious traditionalists
against a secular state but instead involve a face-off between two
religious traditions. Church-state doctrine thus needs to be
reimagined. Some argue that, at a minimum, a new bifurcation
between church and state has to be constructed based on institutional spheres of authority, with churches as sovereign powers
independent of the state.23 At the more radical extreme, some
claim that we should reject the entire idea of church-state separation in favor of an explicitly religious state.24
Part III describes how the Supreme Court has changed the
doctrinal valence of liberal principles in church-state jurisprudence over the course of the last quarter century. Recent decisions under the Religion Clauses, including Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission25 and
Trump v. Hawaii,26 recite the themes of “neutrality,” “general
applicability,” “equal treatment,” and “animus,” but how those
concepts have been applied has shifted significantly over time.
Of course, the terminology of fairness and impartiality has always been contested. This is particularly so in Religion Clause
jurisprudence, where the Court has sought to maintain neutrality between religious actors and their secular counterparts while

22. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 10, at ix–x; Adrian Vermeule, Liturgy of
Liberalism, FIRST THINGS (Jan. 2017), https://www.firstthings.com/article/
2017/01/liturgy-of-liberalism [https://perma.cc/9U44-GFMX] (reviewing
LEGUTKO, supra note 10).
23. See Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church?,
in LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 249,
249–50 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012); see also Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL.
L. REV. 273, 295 (2008); Paul Horwitz, Church as First Amendment Institutions:
Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2009).
24. See Thomas Pink, In Defense of Catholic Integralism, PUB. DISCOURSE
(Aug. 12, 2018), https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2018/08/39362/ [https://
perma.cc/U8NA-KMQJ]; Adrian Vermeule, A Christian Strategy, FIRST THINGS
(Nov. 2017), https://www.firstthings.com/article/2017/11/a-christian-strategy
[https://perma.cc/HY34-YD3P]; see also Graham Walker, Illusory Pluralism, Inexorable Establishment, in OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF
FAITH: RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST DEMOCRACIES 111, 118–23
(Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000).
25. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
26. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
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simultaneously preserving religion’s favored status.27 The new
religious antiliberalism does not solve this dilemma; indeed, it
rejects the enterprise altogether.
As doctrine collapses, what takes its place? Part IV addresses the future of church-state jurisprudence in light of the
antiliberal ascendance. Here we treat antiliberalism as both an
intellectual critique and a political movement. The conventional
political economy story suggests that in a religiously pluralistic
society where Protestant-Catholic divisions are no longer dominant, the public will support evenhanded funding of religious organizations but not overt government endorsement of religion or
religious preferentialism.28 The Court’s doctrine, on this view,
tends to follow social fault lines.
But this story no longer captures the terrain of the religious
culture wars. First, the response to radical Islam and the backlash against Muslim and other forms of ethnic migration has
fueled the rise of Christian nationalism across western societies,
including in the United States.29 Second, in response to the sexual revolution and the recent recognition of LGBT rights, evangelicals, conservative Catholics, and other religious traditionalists have joined forces to advance a conception of religious liberty
that they perceive to be under existential threat.30 These social
conditions have created fertile ground for an antiliberal revival.
For the first time in more than a half century, it is possible to
imagine the Court clearing a doctrinal path and opening the way
toward a more robust form of religious—and, more specifically,
Christian—preferentialism.

27. There is now a robust literature on the question of whether religion
warrants special benefits and special burdens under the First Amendment.
Compare, e.g., EISGRUBER AND SAGER, supra note 15, and LABORDE, supra note
16, and BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2012), and Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012), with, e.g.,
KATHLEEN BRADY, THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN LAW: RETHINKING RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE (2015), and ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (2013), and Christopher
C. Lund, Religion Is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481 (2017).
28. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the
Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 282–83 (2001).
29. See infra Part IV.B.2.
30. See infra Part IV.B.1.
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I. LIBERALISM AND CHURCH-STATE SEPARATION
Before discussing religious antiliberalism, we should begin
by briefly describing what we take to be the core characteristics
of a liberal account of church and state. This will help us understand the various attacks on liberalism and how those attacks
implicate legal doctrine.
Though liberalism is a highly contested concept, we understand it at a minimum to require that the state not concern itself
with the salvation of its citizens. Following John Locke, the liberal state does not seek to coerce belief.31 Religious belief is the
domain of individual conscience.32 The liberal state also does not
treat citizens differently on account of their religious affiliation
or belief. Citizens are equal before the law regardless of their
religious practice.33 This means that the state may not favor
some religious believers over others, especially in the distribution of public benefits and burdens.34 And finally in a liberal
state, there is a distinction between secular and religious law.
The former operates in public and involves state coercion. The
latter operates in private and, though it might involve private
pressure, it cannot be enforced by the state. The state may not
adopt religious law or become an arm of a particular religious
denomination.35
31. See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 53–56 (James
H. Tully ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1983) (1689); see also Micah Schwartzman, The
Relevance of Locke’s Religious Arguments for Toleration, 33 POL. THEORY 678,
690–93 (2005) (discussing Locke’s claim that sincere religious belief cannot be
coerced). For Locke’s influence on the American tradition of religious freedom,
see DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 89–95 (1986);
Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 346, 373–78 (2002).
32. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 205–16 (arguing
for “equal liberty of conscience” and rejecting “[t]he notion of a confessional
state”); RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 12, at 310–15; see also AMY
GUTMANN, IDENTITY IN DEMOCRACY 151–91 (2003); MILTON R. KONVITZ, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE 73–106 (1968); JOCELYN MACLURE &
CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE 62–64 (2011);
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 19–25 (2008).
33. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 15, at 15; TEBBE, supra note 16, at 72–
73.
34. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 212 (“The state can
favor no particular religion and no penalties or disabilities may be attached to
any religious affiliation or lack thereof.”).
35. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 12, at 62; JOHN RAWLS,
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These basic commitments to the separation of church and
state are mainly a product of the Enlightenment. The effort to
separate the state and religion was in part a reaction to the European wars of religion between Protestants and Catholics. 36
Basic principles of religious toleration, if not full civic equality,
found early support in some European states, like the Netherlands.37 And these principles carried over into the nascent
United States.38 Although states had established churches well
into the nineteenth century, the federal government was
founded without an official church.39 The Constitution did not
impose any religious test for office or place civil disabilities on
individuals on account of their faith.40 This national experiment,
which promised equal status to all religious believers, whatever
their denomination, was unique to the United States.41
The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in COLLECTED PAPERS 573, 588–94 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited]; see also ROBERT AUDI, RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULAR REASON
31–41 (2000); LABORDE, supra note 16, at 117–32; Andrew Koppelman, Secular
Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 161–65 (2002); Schwartzman, supra note 27, at
1401–03.
36. This history has been told many times. See JOHN MARSHALL, JOHN
LOCKE, TOLERATION, AND EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT CULTURE 15–194 (2006);
TOLERATION IN ENLIGHTENMENT EUROPE (Ole Peter Grell & Roy Porter eds.,
2000); PEREZ ZAGORIN, HOW THE IDEA OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION CAME TO THE
WEST (2003). But cf. BEYOND THE PERSECUTING SOCIETY: RELIGIOUS TOLERATION BEFORE THE ENLIGHTENMENT (John Christian Laursen & Cary J. Nederman eds., 1998) (detailing the practice of religious toleration in early modern
Europe).
37. See Ernestine van der Wall, Toleration and Enlightenment in the Dutch
Republic, in TOLERATION IN ENLIGHTENMENT EUROPE, supra note 36, at 114;
CALVINISM AND RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN THE DUTCH GOLDEN AGE (R. PoChia Hsia & Henk van Nierop eds., 2002).
38. See generally THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND
STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1994).
39. See 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 18–33 (2008) (discussing the history of disestablishment during the Founding era).
40. See ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: A MORAL DEFENSE OF THE SECULAR STATE 29–33 (2005) (discussing the
rejection of religious tests in the federal Constitution).
41. Daniel L. Dreisbach, The Constitution’s Forgotten Religion Clause: Reflections on the Article VI Religious Test Ban, 38 J. CHURCH & ST. 261, 263
(1996) (“The U.S. Constitution’s prohibition on religious tests for federal officeholders was historically unprecedented.”).
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The intellectual roots of church-state liberalism in the
United States can be traced to foundational texts like John
Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689),42 James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785),43 and Thomas Jefferson’s A Bill for Establishing
Religious Freedom (1779), written for Virginia.44 But liberalism
is a broader philosophical tradition, with roots in the writings of
Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill, among others.45 A liberal theory advances a particular kind of relationship
between the state and its citizens, one that embraces both popular sovereignty and limited government and further presumes
the equal worth of citizens and rejection of the arbitrary exercise
of power.46 The development of rights-enforcing constitutional
democracies can be traced to a liberal theory of the state.47
In the twentieth century, religious toleration served as the
basis for an expansion of the notion of state neutrality toward a
broader range of “conceptions of the good”—to use John Rawls’s
terminology.48 Rawls was a liberal of the late-twentieth century,
a century that witnessed the rise of state-supported fascism and
communism, a surge of nationalism, as well as the liberatory efforts of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities around the world.
Liberalism has been offered as a way to recognize the reasonable
demands of those within diverse societies when agreement on
fundamentals is impossible and when disagreement has too often led to bloodshed. Rawls’s “intuitive idea” was to “generalize
42. LOCKE, supra note 31.
43. JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 29, 29 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
44. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545, 545 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
45. See supra note 11.
46. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 181 (1985); Judith N.
Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 21 (Nancy
L. Rosenblum ed., 1989); Waldron, supra note 11, at 140.
47. See ANDREAS KALYVAS & IRA KATZNELSON, LIBERAL BEGINNINGS:
MAKING A REPUBLIC FOR THE MODERNS (2008); RYAN, supra note 11, at 38–40;
cf. HELENA ROSENBLATT, THE LOST HISTORY OF LIBERALISM: FROM ANCIENT
ROME TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2018) (providing a history of the development and transformation of liberalism).
48. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 12, at 75. According to
Rawls, liberal principles of justice “should be, as far as possible, independent of
the opposing and conflicting philosophical and religious doctrines that citizens
affirm. In formulating such a conception, political liberalism applies the principle of toleration to philosophy itself.” Id. at 9–10.
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the principle of religious toleration to a social form, thereby arriving at equal liberty in public institutions.”49
The aim of political liberalism, following Rawls, is to explain
how citizens with deeply divergent ethical and religious commitments can nevertheless converge on liberal principles of justice
for regulating basic political and economic institutions.50 On this
account, the liberal state does not endorse or enforce a particular
comprehensive worldview—religious or otherwise—but establishes a framework within which individuals are generally free
to pursue their own comprehensive ethical, moral, and religious
ends.51 The state is required to treat all its citizens with equal
concern and respect, and it does so, in part, by not advancing its
own comprehensive religious, philosophical, or ethical agenda.52
This gives rise to an important public/private distinction. In a
liberal state, the exercise of political power is legitimate only if
it can be justified on terms that all citizens can reasonably accept.53 The requirements of “public reason” mean that a state
cannot enforce a law if the only justification for the law is based
on a specific comprehensive doctrine. A standard example of
such a non-public reason is one that relies for its justificatory
force on values or modes of reasoning drawn from a particular
religious tradition.54
Obviously, this formulation of political liberalism is the barest sketch. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries,
Rawls has been a lightning rod for liberalism’s critics, so it is
important to have a sense of his basic claims. But the scholarly
and jurisprudential debates over the Religion Clauses obviously
precede Rawls. Rawls himself makes limited appearances in the
legal literature of church and state and no appearances, as far
49. LABORDE, supra note 16, at 27.
50. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 12, at 134 (developing
and defending “the idea of an overlapping consensus”).
51. Id. at 226–27; see also JONATHAN QUONG, LIBERALISM WITHOUT PERFECTION 41–44 (2011); Charles Larmore, Public Reason, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO RAWLS, supra note 12, at 368, 373–74; Micah Schwartzman, The
Completeness of Public Reason, 3 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 191 (2004).
52. See Schwartzman, supra note 51, at 200.
53. Here we are paraphrasing Rawls’s “liberal principle of legitimacy.” See
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 12, at 217. For elaboration and defense of this principle, see QUONG, supra note 51, at 131–35.
54. Though, as Rawls emphasizes, public reason is also distinguished from
secular comprehensive ethical and moral doctrines. See RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 35, at 583–84.
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as we know, in federal court decisions involving matters of religious freedom.55
It is also important to observe that, although liberalism and
its critics join in battle at the moment of the Enlightenment,
modern debates about the Religion Clauses only take shape in
the mid-twentieth century, when the Supreme Court applied the
First Amendment to the states.56 These debates generally presume the outlines of a non-theocratic, democratic state in which
citizens are empowered to assert rights against a constitutionally limited government. In other words, the general contours of
the liberal state are well-entrenched, even if imperfectly realized, at the moment when the Court first articulates the modern
doctrine of church and state.
Nevertheless, Religion Clause conflicts have forced the
Court to define the limits of state power to fund or otherwise
support religion, to teach religious subjects or promulgate religious principles in schools and other government-run institutions or in public places, to force individuals or groups to engage
in or refrain from engaging in religious practices, to provide exemptions to religious persons from laws that burden their religious conscience, or to adjudicate intra-religious disputes in the
civil courts.57
The appropriate rule in any of these cases has always implicated foundational principles, even as judges and scholars have
seemed to share similar background assumptions. One of these
shared assumptions is what Cécile Laborde calls a requirement
of “minimal secularism.”58 This idea is that the liberal state cannot also be a religious state, at least not in the sense of enforcing
laws that are justified solely on religious grounds. Religious authorities do not exercise civil authority, and vice versa.59 Furthermore, appeals to religious authority—for example, in the

55. A Westlaw search for citations to Rawls’s work in federal courts turns
up about a dozen cases, but none of them involve matters of religious freedom.
56. See 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 39, at 33–39; Frederick Mark Gedicks,
Incorporation of the Establishment Clause Against the States: A Logical, Textual, and Historical Account, 88 IND. L.J. 669 (2013).
57. For surveys of Supreme Court doctrine across these various subjects,
see 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE
AND FAIRNESS (2006); 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 39.
58. LABORDE, supra note 16, at 116.
59. Id. at 143 (“It is because minimal secularism is committed to the sub-
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form of “because scripture says so”—are not a sufficient basis for
legislation or legal decision making.60 The doctrinal debates over
the Religion Clauses have tended to operate within the terms of
these broad principles, even as their application has been contested.
Of course, there have always been those who understand the
basic concept of church-state separation as being compatible
with a robustly Christian state, either by ignoring the First
Amendment or by assimilating it to the idea of a “Christian nation.”61 The Court has been at the center of battles over school
prayer, the teaching of evolution, support for religious instruction, public recognition of majority faiths, and coercive suppression of minority ones.62 Religion Clause doctrine is contested,
both within the terms of a seemingly shared liberalism and when
that liberal project is outright rejected.
In either case, dissatisfaction with and contestation over the
requirements of liberalism means that even basic assumptions
about the appropriate relationship between church and state
cannot be taken for granted. Liberalism and church-state separation are often connected in the minds of both supporters and
critics. When liberalism is under sustained attack, the existing
terms of church-state separation are also under sustained attack.

stantive ideals of personal liberty that it rejects the enforcement of comprehensive doctrines, such as religious doctrines, by the state.”); see also Larkin v.
Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126–27 (1982) (“[T]he core rationale underlying the Establishment Clause is preventing ‘a fusion of governmental and religious functions[.]’ The Framers did not set up a system of government in which
important, discretionary governmental powers would be delegated to or shared
with religious institutions.” (citations omitted)).
60. See Koppleman, supra note 35, at 88.
61. For critical discussions of the claim that the United States is a “Christian nation,” see, for example, STEVEN K. GREEN, INVENTING A CHRISTIAN
AMERICA: THE MYTH OF THE RELIGIOUS FOUNDING (2015); KEVIN M. KRUSE,
ONE NATION UNDER GOD: HOW CORPORATE AMERICA INVENTED CHRISTIAN
AMERICA (2015); DAMON LINKER, THE THEOCONS: SECULAR AMERICA UNDER
SIEGE (2006); Jared A. Goldstein, How the Constitution Became Christian, 68
HASTINGS L.J. 259 (2017).
62. For recent historical treatments of the Court’s involvement in these and
other controversies over religion freedom, see NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD
(2005); SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW: RELIGIOUS VOICES
AND THE CONSTITUTION IN MODERN AMERICA (2010); DAVID SEHAT, THE MYTH
OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2011).
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II. THE ANTILIBERAL REVIVAL
Recent expressions of religious antiliberalism are no exception to this pattern, and they track well their historical predecessors. It is now common to hear the claim that liberalism is in
crisis, that it has failed, or that it is collapsing into some other
regime type, usually authoritarianism of a socialist or fascist variety.63
Antiliberal thought is full of such diagnoses, all of which
start with the same premises. According to critics, liberalism is
somehow both pervasive and self-defeating, although a positive
account of liberalism independent of what it has wrought is difficult to discern. Instead, there is reference to liberalism as “an
encompassing political ecosystem in which we have swum, unaware of its existence.”64 Liberalism is one of the “three great competitor political ideologies,” along with fascism and communism,
but it operates silently.65 Professor Patrick Deneen claims that
“[i]n contrast to its crueler competitor ideologies, liberalism is
more insidious: as an ideology, it pretends to neutrality, claiming
no preference and denying any intention of shaping the souls under its rule.”66 Moreover, liberalism infects every aspect of our
political, social, and personal lives. In all these domains, “liberalism has transformed human institutions in the name of expanding liberty and increasing our mastery and control of our
fates. And in each case . . . the vehicles of our liberation have become iron cages of our captivity.”67
This type of rhetoric is not new. As Stephen Holmes observes in his Anatomy of Antiliberalism, “[t]he disparagement of
liberalism is not a passing fashion of the late twentieth century.
It is a recurring feature of Western political culture at least since
the French revolution. . . . [In] the 1920s and 1930s implacable
hostility to liberalism was the one attitude on which extreme
rightists and extreme leftists could agree.”68 The vehemence of
63. See DENEEN, supra note 10; LEGUTKO, supra note 10; Adrian Vermeule,
All Human Conflict Is Ultimately Theological, CHURCH LIFE J. (July 26, 2019),
https://churchlifejournal.nd.edu/articles/all-human-conflict-is-ultimately
-theological/ [https://perma.cc/RW5L-DYLA].
64. DENEEN, supra note 10, at 4–5.
65. Id. at 5.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 6.
68. HOLMES, supra note 7, at xi.
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those denunciations is continuous with early attacks on the Enlightenment and in particular with the rejection of received
moral or religious authority.
The content of the critique is also similar across time. Antiliberal thinkers tend to agree that the current social and political rot, whether at the turn of the nineteenth or twentieth centuries, is a function of liberalism’s celebration and emancipation
of the autonomous or “liberated individual” and, specifically, the
“disintegration of society into atomized individuals—selfish, calculating, materialistic.”69 The core problem is “the calamity of an
autonomous, irreligious humanistic consciousness.”70 Such societies promote “boundless materialism,”71 sexual licentiousness,
and “a nearly universal pursuit of immediate gratification . . . hedonic titillation, visceral crudeness, and distraction,
all oriented toward promoting consumption, appetite and detachment.”72 The mode of antiliberal thought is similar as well,
as Holmes has described: decry the existing political and spiritual decline of Western society, warn of an impending catastrophe, identify the intellectual and historical moment when the
West lost its way, and suggest how recovering a lost past might
help pull humanity back from the brink.73
How has the antiliberal tradition approached the core liberal commitment of separation of church and state? Early writers in this tradition bemoaned rising secularism and the reduced
power of the Church, rejected out-of-hand the concept of liberal
tolerance, and advocated a return to traditional communal and
hierarchical moral and sexual norms, if not a return to theocratic
governance.74 Perhaps unsurprisingly, some contemporary antiliberals have embraced similar views; in Hungary and Poland,

69. Id. at 6.
70. Id. (quoting ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN, A WORLD SPLIT APART: COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS DELIVERED AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY JUNE 8, 1978, at 57
(Irina Ilovayskaya Alberti trans., 1978)).
71. Id. (quoting SOLZHENITSYN, supra note 70, at 53).
72. DENEEN, supra note 10, at 39.
73. HOLMES, supra note 7, at 5–7.
74. See, e.g., JOSEPH DE MAISTRE, CONSIDERATIONS ON FRANCE (Richard A.
Lebrun ed., 1994); see also ISAIAH BERLIN, Joseph de Maistre and the Origins of
Fascism, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY 91 (Henry Harding ed., 1991);
HOLMES, supra note 7, at 13–36.
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there have been moves toward establishing “illiberal democracy,” defined in terms of conservative Christian nationalism.75
Some contemporary antiliberal thinkers, however, seek to
make peace with a religiously pluralistic society, while protecting and extending religious institutional, cultural, and political
redoubts.76 Others seek to capture political hearts and minds, to

75. The Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, has defended the idea
of “Christian democracy” as “illiberal.” He recently summarized his view in
stark terms:
Let us confidently declare that Christian democracy is not liberal. Liberal democracy is liberal, while Christian democracy is, by definition,
not liberal: it is, if you like, illiberal. And we can specifically say this in
connection with a few important issues – say, three great issues. Liberal democracy is in favour of multiculturalism, while Christian democracy gives priority to Christian culture; this is an illiberal concept. Liberal democracy is pro-immigration, while Christian democracy is antiimmigration; this is again a genuinely illiberal concept. And liberal democracy sides with adaptable family models, while Christian democracy rests on the foundations of the Christian family model; once more,
this is an illiberal concept.
Viktor Orbán, Speech at the 29th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp (July 29, 2018), https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/
the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the
-29th-balvanyos-summer-open-university-and-student-camp [https://perma.cc/
Z2WN-CHTW]; see also Zack Beauchamp, It Happened There: How Democracy
Died in Hungary, VOX (Sept. 13, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy
-and-politics/2018/9/13/17823488/hungary-democracy-authoritarianism-trump
[https://perma.cc/2N8J-DFMC]; Aleksandra Wróbel, Orbán Pledges To Keep
Hungary Safe and Christian, POLITICO (May 7, 2018, 3:06 PM), https://www
.politico.eu/article/orban-christian-migrants-pledges-to-keep-hungary-safe
[https://perma.cc/3E8V-NESQ].
Poland has also moved significantly in the direction of illiberal democracy
and Christian nationalism. See Volha Charnysh, The Rise of Poland’s Far Right:
How Extremism Is Going Mainstream, FOREIGN AFF. (Dec. 18, 2017), https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/poland/2017-12-18/rise-polands-far-right
[https://perma.cc/D96J-38X8]; Will Hutton, Beware the Illiberal Alliance of Poland and Hungary, a Grave Threat to the EU, GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2018, 7:04
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/07/hungary-poland
-had-enough-of-liberal-democracy-eu-must-act [https://perma.cc/WY5U
-YDPG]; Jan-Werner Müller, The Problem with Poland, N.Y. REV. BOOKS: NYR
DAILY (Feb. 11, 2016, 1:22 PM), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/02/11/
kaczynski-eu-problem-with-poland/ [https://perma.cc/G8PH-FDEX] (“[B]oth Poland and Hungary now offer a toxic ideological brew that is reminiscent of interwar Europe: anti-communism and anti-capitalism can be combined and justified in the name of a highly intolerant nationalism based on Christian values
that conclusively define who is a true Hungarian or true Pole.”).
76. See infra Part II.C.
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transform liberal regimes from the inside-out by doing cultural
battle.77
Common to all these approaches is a broad skepticism of the
liberal project. That skepticism takes a variety of forms and generates a range of alternatives. Here, we identify four broad
themes—anti-secularism, anti-paganism, organicism, and integralism—that have recently reemerged in the legal literature.
The first two—anti-secularism and anti-paganism—are mainly
presented as diagnoses of liberalism’s failures and the resulting
culture wars in Western democratic societies. The latter two—
organicism and integralism—are primarily normative proposals;
they provide strategies for responding to the perceived threats
and vulnerabilities of liberal regimes. Although some of these
proposals are radical, skepticism about liberalism does not necessarily entail the abandonment of the basic idea of church-state
separation or liberty of conscience. But as those two ideas could
be said to constitute central aspects of liberalism, it is fair to ask
whether present-day antiliberals lack the courage of their convictions—and, if they were to follow those convictions, what
would be left of religious freedom under the First Amendment.
A. ANTI-SECULARISM
Consider first the claim that Western society is approaching
an “existential crisis for secular liberalism.”78 This apparent crisis is a central trope in the antiliberal canon. Antiliberals argue
that the concept of the “secular” is incoherent and that, in some
cases, the secular state is both hostile to religion and amoral.
The incoherence of the secular is directly connected with its lack
of moral foundations.79 According to the critical literature, which
emerges on both the political left and the right, our theory of
church-state separation, and more specifically, our current Religion Clause doctrine, rests on a contradiction. Modern religious
liberty has a religious foundation. Though its basic categories
77. See infra Part II.D.
78. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al., Introduction to AFTER SECULAR LAW
1, 1 (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al. eds., 2011).
79. See, e.g., 2 HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE IMPACT OF
THE PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION, at x
(2003) (“And today it is not evident what new fundamental beliefs have replaced
orthodox religious beliefs as a foundation on which our legal institutions rest.
Consequently, our legal discourse, our network of legal values, lacks the power
and vitality that it once had.”).
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cannot be acknowledged as religious, the political and legal instantiation of those categories forces a psychological and social
separatism that is incongruent with how religious people often
understand their own beliefs and practices.80
This critique of secularism has two main parts. The first is
a claim that the bifurcation between secular and religious is itself religious, grounded in a certain form of Christianity. The argument that church-state separation represents a distinctly
Protestant theological outlook is now commonplace.81 Some antiliberals embrace the religious and specifically Christian roots
of secularism, but they often bemoan the development of the secular from its Catholic origins toward a privatized conception after the Protestant Reformation.82
The asserted failure of liberalism to understand and make
explicit its religious foundations is linked to a second objection.
Critics argue that the liberal state wrongly excludes religious
reasons as grounds for justifying law-making in a democratic society.83 Liberal theories are often condemned for requiring wideranging restrictions on making religious arguments in the public
sphere, though standard accounts of public reason, including
80. See WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 1–12 (2005).
81. See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE 107–50 (2010); Talal Asad, Thinking about Religion, Belief and Politics,
in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RELIGIOUS STUDIES 36, 43–45 (Robert A.
Orsi ed., 2012); Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Believing in Religious Freedom, in
POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 45, 46–49 (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al.
eds., 2015); Saba Mahmood, Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide?, 35 CRITICAL INQUIRY 836 (2009). But see LABORDE, supra note
16, at 32–36 (rejecting what she calls the “Protestant critique”).
82. See BERMAN, supra note 79, at 193; BRAD S. GREGORY, THE UNINTENDED REFORMATION: HOW A RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION SECULARIZED SOCIETY
365–87 (2012).
83. There is an extensive literature criticizing this view. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN LIBERAL POLITICS (2002); KENT
GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); SMITH,
supra note 81; Michael W. McConnell, Secular Reason and the Misguided Attempt To Exclude Religious Argument from Democratic Deliberation, 1 J.L.
PHIL. & CULTURE 159 (2007); Nicholas Wolterstorff, Why We Should Reject
What Liberalism Tells Us About Speaking and Acting in Public for Religious
Reasons, in RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM 162 (Paul Weithman
ed., 1997); cf. Jonathan Quong, Public Reason, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct.
24, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/public-reason/
[https://perma.cc/46MU-G6S7] (surveying literature on objections to public reason, including the exclusion of appeals to religious convictions).
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Rawls’s, are more nuanced and permissive than many have recognized.84 Such accounts are concerned not only about religious
reasons, but also reasons drawn from secular comprehensive
doctrines, as the state ought to be neutral, so far as possible,
among competing conceptions of the good.85 Accordingly, citizens
can rightly demand that exercises of political power be justified
on the basis of public reasons, which can be shared by those with
differing conceptions of the good.86
The exclusion of religious reasons has long been a source of
antiliberal discontent. Richard John Neuhaus’s The Naked Public Square made this concern widely known in the 1980s.87 His
complaint, that modern church-state doctrine’s restriction of religious voices in public evinces hostility to religion, has become a
common criticism among religious conservatives.88 Left-leaning
theorists also criticize the bifurcation of the political world into
public/private, asserting that state power undergirds all supposedly “private” acts. The religious/secular binary is both constructed and oppressive, insofar as it marginalizes religious
modes of political life.89

84. See Micah Schwartzman, The Sincerity of Public Reason, 19 J. POL.
PHIL. 375, 394 (2011) (“[T]he wide view of public reason does not prevent citizens and officials from presenting their ethical and religious arguments in public deliberation. Nothing in the principle of sincere public justification precludes
supplementing public reasons with arguments based on nonpublic values.”).
85. See RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 35, at 583–
84, 587–88 (comparing religious and “secular reason,” and arguing that both are
outside the domain of public reason).
86. See id. For some recent defenses of this view, see ANDREW LISTER, PUBLIC REASON AND POLITICAL COMMUNITY (2013); LORI WATSON & CHRISTIE
HARTLEY, EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND PUBLIC REASON: A FEMINIST POLITICAL LIBERALISM (2018); Jonathan Quong, On the Idea of Public Reason, in A COMPANION TO RAWLS, supra note 12, at 265.
87. RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1984).
88. See, e.g., HUGH HECLO, CHRISTIANITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
128–32 (2007); SMITH, supra note 10, at 334–43; Michael W. McConnell, Five
Reasons To Reject the Claim that Religious Arguments Should Be Excluded from
Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 639 (1999); Matthew J. Franck,
The Unreasonableness of Secular Public Reason, PUB. DISCOURSE (Aug. 28,
2015), https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/08/14619/ [https://perma.cc/
GJ9W-LD6U].
89. Consider Craig Calhoun’s claim that the “use of the public/private distinction to enforce a kind of secularism is embarrassingly reminiscent of the use
of the same distinction to minimize . . . women’s political participation.” Craig
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But the real concern is the disqualification of religious reasons for law-making. Religious antiliberalism is deeply suspicious of any effort to distinguish between religious and secular
reasons, policies, or forms of government—indeed, to define “religion” or “religious” in contradistinction to something else called
“secular” at all. The inability to settle on a definition—one that
does not import substantive judgments about what constitutes
reasonable and rational argument and what does not—leads to
claims about the “impossibility of religious freedom.”90
The deconstruction of the religious/secular divide also leads
to difficulties in defining other terms, like “theocracy.” To the
extent that the liberal state is, by definition, non-theocratic, the
crisis of liberalism opens the door to explicitly theocratic regimes. Of course, if secularism is itself a religion or a theological
concept, then we already live in a theocratic regime. Contemporary antiliberals on both the left and the right have invoked Carl
Schmitt’s famous claim that “[a]ll significant concepts of the
modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts.”91 Schmittian “political theology” posits a world in which
secularization is the transfer of authority from an omnipotent
God to an omnipotent ruler, in which the modern concept of sovereignty is a secularized version of the theological idea of divine
authority.92
This notion of the liberal state as displaced theology is a consistent antiliberal trope, shared by antistatist critics on the left
who are attracted to the disintegration of the concept of the secular.93 These critics are more concerned about the state’s juridical power to define religion to the exclusion of minority believers

Calhoun, Secularism, Citizenship, and the Public Sphere, in RETHINKING SECULARISM 77 (Craig Calhoun et al. eds., 2011).
90. SULLIVAN, supra note 80, at 1.
91. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 36 (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2005)
(1922).
92. See HOLMES, supra note 7, at 46–47; John P. McCormick, Review: Political Theory and Political Theology: The Second Wave of Carl Schmitt in English, 26 POL. THEORY 830 (1998).
93. See Banu Bargu, Stasiology: Political Theology and the Figure of the
Sacrificial Enemy, in AFTER SECULAR LAW, supra note 78, at 140, 140–55; Craig
Calhoun et al., Introduction to RETHINKING SECULARISM, supra note 89, at 3, 5;
Sullivan et al., supra note 78, at 1–12.
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than they are about the liberal state’s inability to rule.94 On their
view, the secular state is quite powerful already, though it is also
vulnerable to religious schism and ethnic violence.95 The secular
state appears unable to comprehend or address the rising religiosity in its midst. And so, paradoxically, secularism is also quite
fragile, so much so that perhaps the whole project should be
abandoned.96
B. ANTI-PAGANISM
In recent years, especially among religious conservatives,
the antiliberal critique of secularism has taken a more distinctive form.97 As we have seen, the critique is that liberalism is the
product of a particular religious view,98 and, as such, it promotes
an ethical and moral perspective that can be characterized as
religious. But if liberalism is a religion, which religion is it?
According to some antiliberal critics, the answer is that liberalism is a form of paganism. Consider Milton Himmelfarb’s assertion, made in the early 1990s, that “[t]he trouble is not that
religion in general has too small a role in American public life.
The trouble is that a particular religion has too great a role—
paganism, the de facto established religion.”99 The target here
was and is liberalism:
The Enlightenment’s project was liberal—to liberate us for the pursuit
of our happiness. But much of what began as liberal has turned libertine, and libertinism has brought not liberation and happiness so much
as enslavement and misery: AIDS, kids who have kids, the absent father. First the French Revolution devoured its children, then the Bolshevik Revolution, and now the sexual revolution.100

A more recent and refined version of this argument can be
found in Professor Steven Smith’s recent book, Pagans and
94. Cf. Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV.
4, 33–35 (1983).
95. See Mark Juergensmeyer, Rethinking the Secular and Religious Aspects
of Violence, in RETHINKING SECULARISM, supra note 89, at 185, 196–99.
96. See Sullivan et al., supra note 78, at 16.
97. This Part draws on material from Richard Schragger & Micah
Schwartzman, Jews, Not Pagans, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 497 (2019).
98. See, e.g., Sullivan et al., supra note 79, at 8. But see LABORDE, supra
note 16, at 6, 32–36 (rejecting Sullivan’s critique that liberalism is a form of
Protestantism).
99. Milton Himmelfarb, in AMERICAN JEWS AND THE SEPARATIONIST FAITH
65, 65 (David G. Dalin ed., 1992).
100. Id. at 66.
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Christians in the City.101 Smith joins other antiliberals in describing Western cultural conflict as a battle between Christianity and the “modern paganism” of secular liberals.102 “Christian,”
for Smith, is a term for all those who believe in a transcendent
God, including orthodox religious believers across faith traditions.103 Pagans, by contrast, reject transcendent religion in favor of non-natural but immanent conceptions of the good.104 Culturally, pagans are the vast majority of secularized Westerners,
who are assimilated to the dominant culture: liberalism.105
Smith’s diagnosis of the culture conflict is not entirely new.
Indeed, Smith frames his project as an effort to revive and defend T.S. Eliot’s thesis that Western societies are marked by existential conflict between Christianity and paganism.106 Writing
in the 1930s, Eliot argued that Christianity in the West was under attack by “Liberalism,” which elevated the values of individuality and originality over the traditional morality of the
Church.107 In The Idea of a Christian Society, he called for the
Christianization of England, which he feared was slouching toward paganism.108 Eliot’s Christian establishment was intended
to reflect, support, and direct a Christian society. The alternative
was to “merely sink into an apathetic decline” or become a
“totalitarian democracy.”109 To those “who are . . . repelled
by . . . such a prospect,” Eliot responded, “one can assert that the
only possibility of control and balance is a religious control and
101. SMITH, supra note 10; see also Robert P. George, Foreword to id., at
ix–xiv (adopting Smith’s claim that liberals and progressives are “neopagans”);
John Waters, Defending the Religious Sense, FIRST THINGS (Nov. 4, 2019),
https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2019/11/defending-the-religious
-sense [https://perma.cc/F4FR-7MDJ] (same).
102. See SMITH, supra note 10.
103. See id. at 216, 223, 303.
104. Id. at 210–12; cf. Charles Taylor, Western Secularity, in RETHINKING
SECULARISM, supra note 89, at 31, 33 (claiming that “a broader distinction, that
which divided ‘this world,’ or the immanent, from the transcendent . . . has become part of our way of seeing things in the West”).
105. See SMITH, supra note 10, at 246–48.
106. Id. at 8–11, 378–79; see also R.R. RENO, RESURRECTING THE IDEA OF A
CHRISTIAN SOCIETY (2016).
107. T.S. ELIOT, AFTER STRANGE GODS: A PRIMER OF MODERN HERESY
22–23, 48 (1934).
108. T.S. ELIOT, CHRISTIANITY & CULTURE: THE IDEA OF A CHRISTIAN SOCIETY AND NOTES TOWARDS THE DEFINITION OF CULTURE 16, 20–35 (1949).
109. Id. at 18.
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balance; that the only hopeful course for a society which would
thrive and continue its creative activity in the arts of civilisation,
is to become Christian.”110
Eliot, in turn, was reiterating a set of claims already made
popular by earlier antiliberal thinkers. The attack on liberalism—or on variations such as “secular humanism”—has been remarkably consistent. Notably, much of that attack, at least in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, had a sinister element. It was explicitly anti-Semitic. That anti-Semitism appears
in Eliot’s poetry,111 but it is also integral to his vision of the
Christian Society.112 In a series of lectures collected under the
title After Strange Gods, he asserted that cultural homogeneity
was an essential precondition for such a society.113 Eliot wrote
that “[w]hat is still more important is unity of religious background; and reasons of race and religion combine to make any
large number of free-thinking Jews undesirable.”114
The link between “free-thinking Jews” and liberalism is not
coincidental.115 In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
liberalism meant the rejection of the religious state, recognition
of rights of conscience, and, in Europe most consequentially, the
political emancipation of the Jews.116 That is why the history of
antiliberal thought is suffused with concern with the “Jewish
question.”117 For certain critics of liberalism, the problem of the
Jews of Europe was that they refused to recognize Christianity
and therefore also the Christian foundations of society and the
state. There was no way to bring Jews into the fold. As Isaiah
Berlin observed in describing this line of thinking: “To tolerate

110. Id. at 18–19.
111. See ANTHONY JULIUS, T. S. ELIOT, ANTI-SEMITISM, AND LITERARY FORM
(2d ed. 2003); CHRISTOPHER B. RICKS, T. S. ELIOT AND PREJUDICE 50 (1988);
Walter A. Strauss, The Merchant of Venom? T. S. Eliot and Anti-Semitism, 14
S. CENT. REV. 31 (1997); Louis Menand, Eliot and the Jews, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
(June 6, 1996), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1996/06/06/eliot-and-the
-jews/ [https://perma.cc/KG4E-R3LW] (reviewing JULIUS, supra).
112. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 97.
113. ELIOT, supra note 107.
114. Id. at 20.
115. See JULIUS, supra note 111, at 157–65.
116. Id.
117. Cf. Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER
26 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978).
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[the Jews] as an organized religion is a concession to that liberalism and rationalism that constitutes a denial of what men are
for, to serve the true God.”118
Other antiliberal writers in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries made the relationship between Jews and liberalism more explicit. Consider such assertions that “liberalism is
nothing but secularized Judaism,”119 or that “[e]very Jew is a liberal. He is a liberal by nature.”120 To the Christian traditionalist,
the modern Jew posed a “double challenge, both to the primary
need of culture for religion, and to the subsidiary need for unity
of religious background.”121 That is because modern Jews are
“agents both of secularism and heterodoxy.”122 Abraham Kuyper,
who was prime minister of the Netherlands at the turn of the
century and a neo-Calvinist theologian, decried the Jews for
spreading the “Jewish spirit” of liberalism and modernism
among non-Jews.123 More importantly, the Jew (and the liberal)
118. JULIUS, supra note
THE NORTH 52 (1993)).

111, at 159 (quoting ISAIAH BERLIN, THE MAGUS OF

119. Id. at 158 (quoting HUGO VALENTINE, ANTISEMITISM HISTORICALLY
62 (1971)).
120. Id. at 158 (quoting ERNST NOLTE, THREE FACES OF FASCISM 70 (1969)).
121. Id. at 165.
122. Id. (“Jews appear to contribute to a culture without sharing that culture’s religion; they also have their own culture without benefit of adherence to
Judaism. Free-thinking, they are attached neither to the religion of their birth
nor to any other religion.”).
123. See Ivo Schöffer, Abraham Kuyper and the Jews, in DUTCH JEWISH HISTORY 237, 248–50 (Jozeph Michman & Tirtsah Levie eds., 1984) (describing
Kuyper’s attitude toward Jews and his warnings against a spreading “Jewishness”). Abraham Kuyper’s anti-Semitic tract, Liberalisten en Joden, apparently
has not been translated into English. This may explain why some American
scholars have overlooked his overt religious bigotry. See, e.g., John Witte, Jr.,
The Biography and Biology of Liberty: Abraham Kuyper and the American Experiment, in RELIGION, PLURALISM, AND PUBLIC LIFE: ABRAHAM KUYPER’S LEGACY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 243–62 (Luis E. Lugo ed., 2000). Strangely, Witte
cites Liberalisten en Joden for the proposition that Kuyper “insisted on the inclusion of Jews within the ambit of religious liberty.” Id. at 246 n.10. But there
is no mention that from the opening paragraphs of his essay, Kuyper claimed
that “[g]radually one comes to realize that under the cloak of Liberalism the
Jews have become the lord and master of our continent, and not only control
public opinion within most countries, but also the international relations between [them].” A. KUYPER, LIBERALISTEN EN JODEN 5 (1878) (unpublished partial translation by Professor Mila Versteeg, Martha Lubin Karsh & Bruce A.
Karsh Bicentennial Professor of Law, University of Va.) (on file with authors).
It is remarkable that Kuyper’s anti-Semitism has been so long ignored by commentators and scholars in the United States.
AND CRITICALLY EXAMINED
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posed a challenge to state power—as freedom of conscience
served as a limitation on the state—a “liberal erosion of political
authority for the sake of personal freedom.”124 For Carl Schmitt,
the preeminent antiliberal statist of Nazi Germany, “Jewish liberalism” was the disease infecting German culture.125
Of course, Steven Smith and other current antiliberal thinkers who embrace the Christian/pagan conflict do not trade in
anti-Semitic tropes. But the place of religious minorities—
whether Jewish, Muslim, Christian or otherwise—causes serious problems for a revived antiliberal theory that posits only two
cultural options: Christianity or paganism, even if the former is
understood ecumenically.126 Smith’s Christian society embraces
transcendent meaning and rejects liberal assimilation and its
cultural manifestation, secular humanism.127 Some conservative
or traditional religious minorities might also find that a “Christian” society better conforms to their cultural and moral views,
but there is little, if any, recognition that many religious minorities reject such views without thereby becoming “pagans.”128
Eliot had less trouble identifying liberal religious minorities. He saw them as a threat, and partly for that reason, he rejected religious disestablishment.129 He also appeared to reject
toleration. Cultural homogeneity was a central precondition for
the Christian society. Smith and other current-day antiliberals,
by contrast, do not generally endorse a Christian state, even if
that seems like a natural extension of their arguments.130 After
124. HOLMES, supra note 7, at 53.
125. Id. at 50–51. Schmitt blamed liberalism for the weakness of the German
state between the wars: “Perfidious Jewish writers smuggled liberal constitutional principles into Wilhelminian Germany.” Id. at 38. As Holmes notes, “cultural antisemitism was integral to [Schmitt’s] thinking.” Id. at 50. Those liberal
principles—separation of powers, competitive elections, political parties, and
the free press—were anathema to Schmitt, who believed that liberal regimes
were “fainthearted” and “nonconfrontationalist,” id. at 45, and unable to protect
themselves when attacked. Schmitt’s authoritarianism is a rejection of “weak”
(read: Jewish) liberalism. See id. at 44–45.
126. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 97, at 499–504 (criticizing
the “message that [Jews] can be either Christian or pagans”).
127. SMITH, supra note 10, at 378–79.
128. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 97, at 505 (arguing that
Smith’s theory postulates “[t]he Good Jews . . . are resisters of paganism” while
“the Bad Jews” are “the assimilated, secularized, and paganized Jews”).
129. ELIOT, supra note 108, at 20–24.
130. See SMITH, supra note 10, at 377–79. But see infra Part II.B; cf. Vermeule, supra note 24 (arguing the Church should enter into “flexible alliances
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all, why not favor a Christian state if it supports the moral and
spiritual goods that are so valuable to meaningful human existence? Why not reject the various forms of paganism, including
liberal Protestant or enlightenment beliefs that slouch toward
paganism, that undermine those goods? And why not enlist the
state’s power to spread belief in the source of transcendent
meaning, namely, Christianity?
Smith and other modern antiliberals do not readily provide
an answer. But the options are limited. If the dangers and depredations of pagan society are so severe, one can either exit or
resist. Some antiliberal thinkers have advocated the former in
the face of a culturally foreign modernity.131 Smith advocates the
latter, at least implicitly, by throwing in his lot with Eliot. But
he provides little, if any, conceptual space for co-existence. Ultimately, one has to choose between one form of religious practice
and another—Christianity or paganism. Since it is religion allthe-way down, the state cannot be neutral. It has to choose.
C. ORGANICISM
How to accommodate modern religious pluralism while rejecting liberalism presents a problem. In another line of contemporary antiliberal thought, the solution seems to be some form
of “separate spheres,” or divided sovereignty: church on one side,
state on the other. Smith invokes ancient Rome and the conflict
between early Christians and pagans as the usable historical
past that can help explain contemporary church-state doctrine.132 But he and other theorists have also recently invoked
the medieval conflicts over church power as the appropriate
guide for modern church-state relations.133 It is notable that in
of convenience” as a part of a long-term strategy to establish a confessional
state).
131. See, e.g., ROD DREHER, THE BENEDICT OPTION: A STRATEGY FOR CHRISTIANS IN A POST-CHRISTIAN NATION 80 (2017) (questioning where the “erstwhile” Christians fit in “the politics of post-Christian America” and answering
“[w]e don’t”).
132. See SMITH, supra note 10, at 130–92.
133. See Steven D. Smith, The Jurisdictional Conception of Church Autonomy, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 20–37 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016); Richard W. Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”: (Towards) an Exposition, Translation, and Defense, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
33, 52–57 (2013); Paul Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institutionalism, 99 VA.
L. REV. 1049, 1052 (2013); Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Liberty of the
Church: Source, Scope, and Scandal, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 165, 187–
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both instances, the historical moment that seems most relevant
to the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses—the Enlightenment—is elided. Modernity appears to provide no resource for
the weary church-state theorist.134
The recourse to the medieval is in part a function of dissatisfaction with liberalism’s individualism. Liberalism and individualism are conflated in the minds of many antiliberals, who
challenge liberal thought on the ground that it underappreciates
the role of community, church, family, group, and association in
constituting, guiding, and constraining human agency. Liberalism is faulted for its problematic celebration and reification of
the freely-choosing, autonomous, “unencumbered” self, a construct that does not comport with the experience of those who
exist within particular cultural traditions, histories, and contexts.135
An attractive alternative for some church-state scholars is
the idea of an organic social order, in which churches and other
collective bodies constitute pre-legal, natural features of the social landscape.136 This view arises out of medieval theological
concepts, in particular a commitment to the unified personality

89 (2013). See generally THE CONSCIENCE OF THE INSTITUTION (Helen Alvare
ed., 2014) (collecting essays discussing perceived threats to religious institutions and advocating greater protection and autonomy for them).
134. We have criticized the selective use of (medieval) history to justify contemporary claims of “freedom of the church.” See Richard Schragger & Micah
Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917, 932–39
(2013) [hereinafter Schragger & Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism]; Richard C. Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Lost in Translation: A Dilemma for Freedom of the Church, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 15, 16 (2013)
[hereinafter Schragger & Schwartzman, Lost in Translation]; see also Frederick
Mark Gedicks, True Lies: Canossa as Myth, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 133,
135 (2013); Andrew Koppelman, “Freedom of the Church” and Authority of the
State, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 145, 146 (2013).
135. These criticisms are familiar from the communitarian critiques of liberalism that were prominent in the 1980s and 1990s. See generally STEPHEN
MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS AND COMMUNITARIANS (1996); COMMUNITARIANISM AND INDIVIDUALISM (Shlomi Avineri & Avner de-Shalit eds., 1992)
(especially essays by Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre, and
Michael Walzer).
136. See generally WALTER ULLMANN, THE GROWTH OF THE PAPAL GOVERNMENT IN THE MIDDLE AGES: A STUDY IN THE IDEOLOGICAL RELATION OF CLERICAL TO LAY POWER 358–81 (3d ed. 1970) (discussing “jurisitic theology” based
on “medieval canon law . . . as a universal law . . . to which . . . all other legal
systems became subsidiary”).
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of the Church. Influenced heavily by Otto von Gierke’s interpretation and adaptation of medieval political theory,137 which emphasized the personality of corporate bodies, and taken up later
by the early-twentieth century British Pluralists,138 the idea of
an organic order is deployed to give heft to the church’s claim for
independence from the state.139 Consider John Neville Figgis, asserting in 1913, in Churches and the Modern State:
Now the State did not create the family, nor did it create the Churches;
nor even in any real sense can it be said to have created the club or the
trades union; nor in the Middle Ages the guild or the religious order,
hardly even the universities . . . they have all arisen out of the natural
associative instincts of mankind, and should all be treated . . . as having a life original and guaranteed, to be controlled and directed like
persons . . . .140

The embrace of “natural” and organic sovereign institutions
as checks on the impersonal state seems to evoke Ferdinand
Tönnies’s distinction between community and society, Gemeinshaft and Gesellshaft.141 Implicit in this argument is the notion that the church, along with the family, the guild, the commune, and the university, gains its authority by acting as a
counter-weight to the ever-expanding regulatory state. These
forms of association are personal and communal; members are
137. See OTTO GIERKE, ASSOCIATIONS AND LAW: THE CLASSICAL AND EARLY
CHRISTIAN STAGES (George Heiman ed. & trans., 1977); OTTO GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE (Frederic William Maitland trans., 1900).
138. See CÉCILE LABORDE, PLURALIST THOUGHT AND THE STATE IN BRITAIN
AND FRANCE, 1900–25, at 13 (2000) (“Real group persons had to be both unified
and vital, like a true organism, and true organicism was only to be found in the
political thought of the middle ages.”); DAVID RUNCIMAN, PLURALISM AND THE
PERSONALITY OF THE STATE 46 (2005) (defining the “organic” account of associations as views that held association to “emerge[ ] naturally out of social life”
and as unable to be “reduced to individual components”).
139. See Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Some Realism About
Corporate Rights, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note
133, at 349–50, 358 (“The claim that associations are pre-legal, natural features
of the social landscape is indebted to medieval theological concepts, especially
the unified personality of the church.”).
140. JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS, CHURCHES IN THE MODERN STATE 47 (2d ed.
1914).
141. See FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY 22, 52 (Jose
Harris ed., Jose Harris & Margaret Hollis trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001)
(1887) (defining “Gemeinshaft” as human wills that are related to each other by
descent and kinship, or become so out of necessity, and “Gesellschaft” as a group
of people who live peacefully alongside one another but without being essentially united).
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bound by affective ties and self-regulated by common mores. In
these communities, individual members are more oriented to the
collective than to their own self-interest.142 The state, by contrast, is characterized by the proliferation of formal, rational, impersonal ties and organizations.143 Moreover, it is destructive of
local associational life, thus necessitating limits on its authority.144 The conflict between Gemeinshaft and Gesellshaft is an
abiding concern of those who worry about the rationalization and
materialism of the modern world. A central theme in antiliberal
literature (and its cousin, romanticism) is the alienation of modern individuals—from nature, from community, and from themselves.145
How do these concepts find their way into the modern law
and theory of church and state? The concept of the organic
church responds to two concerns about the nature of liberal
rights. The first is that liberalism erases the distinction between
religious bodies and other forms of association by treating all organizations as if they are voluntary associations or clubs.146 If

142. Cf. JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 149 (2000) (“The
church is usually viewed as a kind of unified whole, different from the sum of
its parts. The glue that holds it together is not contractual . . . . The church is
thought to be something real with a good of its own, not a procedural device for
advancing members’ interests.”).
143. Cf. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 181–82 (Talcott Parsons trans., Charles Scribner’s Sons 1958) (1905) (discussing the development of the rational, mechanical relationships of a capitalistic society).
144. Cf. Cover, supra note 94, at 32–34 (discussing the impact of “[t]he
state’s explicit or implicit acknowledgment of a limited sphere of autonomy” on
the associational autonomy of groups with established normative value systems
external to the state).
145. See, e.g., CHARLES J. CHAPUT, STRANGERS IN A STRANGE LAND: LIVING
THE CATHOLIC FAITH IN A POST-CHRISTIAN WORLD 4–5 (2017) (“To protect the
sovereignty of individuals, democracy separates them from one another. And to
achieve that, the state sooner or later seeks to break down any relationship or
entity that stands in its way.”); DENEEN, supra note 10, at 60 (discussing the
substitution of the state for “traditional human communities and institutions”);
see also HOLMES, supra note 7, at 231 (“Antiliberals ordinarily vilify rights as
atomizing and alienating.”); cf. NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, ANOTHER LIBERALISM:
ROMANTICISM AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF LIBERAL THOUGHT 63 (1987) (discussing liberalism’s collapse of the public and private spheres and how that contributes to the alienation of the individual).
146. See Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches
(Just) Like the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMMENT. 515 (2007) (discussing
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that is so, then it is difficult to justify the special, unique, and
protected status of churches and religious believers. The second
and related concern is that liberalism demands that the state
protect individuals from being coerced by non-state groups or institutions.147 This demand can be threatening to the institutional authority of the church. When critics raise alarm about
the overweening state and assert that the government’s regulatory power needs to be constrained, they are most centrally worried about the state’s interference in religious bodies.148
If churches are natural, pre-legal, and pre-political bodies,
they have a special claim to govern in their sphere. Separate
spheres theory generates a space for churches, treats them as
unique as compared to nonreligious groups, and offers an account of church-state separation that emphasizes institutional
autonomy, not individual conscience.149
An example of a sovereignty-based conception of churchstate relations is the Catholic concept of libertas ecclesiae, or
“freedom of the church,” which has become newly popular among
a group of conservative church-state scholars.150 Freedom of the
church made its appearance during the Investiture controversy
at the end of the eleventh century, when Pope Gregory VII
sought to revoke the authority of temporal rulers to select and
govern clergy in their territories.151 The result was the Wars of
Investiture, a fifty-year conflict over the relative powers of
church and crown.152
whether “religious associations” are different from associations such as the Boy
Scouts “so far as the constitution is concerned”).
147. See Schragger & Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, supra note 134, at 957–62 (arguing that voluntarism is a necessary condition for
church autonomy).
148. See sources cited supra note 133.
149. See Schragger & Schwartzman, Lost in Translation, supra note 134, at
16 (arguing that theories of “freedom of the church” are committed to “three
theses—involving the sovereignty, specialness, and singularity of religious institutions”).
150. See, e.g., Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, supra note 133, at 61
(“[T]he libertas ecclesiae principle could be helpful, if not essential, to an understanding of . . . the religious freedom protected by the First Amendment of our
Constitution.”); Smith, supra note 133, at 19–37 (arguing “the jurisdictional
conception of church autonomy . . . is consistent with the constitutional scheme
and supportable on a contemporary . . . approach to governmental authority”).
151. BRIAN TIERNEY, THE CRISIS OF CHURCH AND STATE 1050–1300, at 45
(1988).
152. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF
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Some have declared freedom of the church to be the true
origin of church-state separation in the West, arguing that the
current doctrinal and theoretical focus on individual rights of
conscience should be replaced with a new emphasis on institutional power and authority.153 On this anti-rights account, the
church is analogized to a foreign sovereign, and the question is
how to divide power between church and state. The church is not
merely a voluntary association; instead it possesses and exercises jurisdictional sovereignty.154
Of course, the sovereign church is an anachronism outside
the Middle Ages, in a time when there is not just one church but
many.155 Pluralism causes difficulties for a sovereignty-based account. While the one true church may have had a special status
in medieval society, it cannot be said to maintain that status today.156 Indeed, the medieval notion of church freedom has little
to do with freedom of conscience, which did not exist as a concept
until much later.157 That innovation, which followed the
Protestant Reformation and the development of “rights of man”
thereafter, serves as the basis for the modern commitment to
disestablishment and free exercise.158

WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 87 (1983) (“Civil war between the papal and
imperial parties raged sporadically throughout Europe until 1122 . . . .”); TIERNEY, supra note 151, at 45–73 (discussing the various conflicts of Pope Gregory
VII’s reign, specifically with King Henry IV of Germany). See generally R.W.
SOUTHERN, WESTERN SOCIETY AND THE CHURCH IN THE MIDDLE AGES 100–04
(1970) (situating Pope Gregory VII within papal history); ULLMANN, supra note
136, at 148–72 (listing and expanding on the conflicts of the Gregorian papacy
of the eleventh century).
153. See Smith, supra note 23, at 250 (“The Constitution could be understood—and would be improved by being understood—as mandating distinctive
treatment not of religion, but of the church.”).
154. Id. at 268–69 (analogizing the Church to a foreign embassy with “ambassadors of the kingdom of God within the secular domain”).
155. See Schragger & Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, supra note 134, at 933–37 (elaborating this charge of anachronism).
156. Id. at 936.
157. See Anna Su, Catholic Constitutionalism from the Americanist Controversy to Dignitatis Humanae, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1445, 1446–47 (2016)
(noting the development of “freedom of conscience” during the twentieth century
as part of John Courtney Murray S.J.’s writings).
158. On this point, proponents of “freedom of the church” may agree, even if
they lament this development. See Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The
Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1869, 1876–78 (2009) (“[T]he
THE
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Corporatism or separate spheres, which can be understood
as a kind of communitarianism or “soft” antiliberalism,159 cannot
readily generate the individual rights necessary to protect religious dissenters, even if it might protect their communities.160
The emphasis on organic groups and the importance of mediating institutions is a form of anti-statism, or perhaps a gesture
toward legal pluralism. But if such groups exercise real coercive
or sovereign power, beyond what is contemplated by conventional rights of association, then what makes them different
from the overweening state? The original freedom of the church
meant the papal exercise of state authority. In the feudal system
of eleventh century Europe, bishops were not only spiritual leaders but also royal officials, exercising vast coercive power.161 A
proliferation of sovereigns, exercising coercive power within
their spheres, seems only to multiply the potential restrictions
on individual liberty.
Some antiliberals advocate recourse to communal settings—
counter-cultural, intentional communities—presumably more
organic and authentic ways of living with one another.162 But
why these communities would not be as, or more, oppressive

Protestant Reformation altered the significance of conscience in a way that profoundly affected, and to some extent redirected, historical commitments to the
separation of church and state.”).
159. Cf. HOLMES, supra note 7, at 88 (distinguishing between “soft antiliberals,” who, “when faced with practical choices, reveal a surprising fondness for
liberal protections,” and “hard antiliberals,” who “dare to draw . . . shocking political consequences,” including “conformist bigotry”).
160. See B. Jessie Hill, Change, Dissent, and the Problem of Consent in Religious Organizations, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra
note 133, at 419–40 (“If the church is exempted from the requirement of complying with federal civil rights laws, then its members—or some of them—are
left unprotected.”); Schragger & Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, supra note 134, at 948–49, 960–62 (discussing the “competing individual
rights” of members of the church and nonmembers).
161. See generally WALTER ULLMANN, THE GROWTH OF THE PAPAL GOVERNMENT IN THE MIDDLE AGES: A STUDY IN THE IDEOLOGICAL RELATION OF CLERICAL TO LAY POWER 7–8, 132–33, 139, 281 (3d ed. 1970) (discussing the role and
power of bishops in papal government and drawing analogies between clerical
positions and state positions, i.e. “the archbishops correspond to the kings”).
162. See DENEEN, supra note 10, at 192–97 (advocating for counter-cultural
communities that “must be born out of voluntarist intentions, plans, and actions”); DREHER, supra note 131, at 122–44 (discussing tactics to promote the
idea of a “Christian village” to raise children, inspired by the proverb: “It takes
a village to raise a child”).
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than the liberal state is unclear. Separate spheres, church sovereignty, or intentional communities—these may replace one oppressor with another.163
D. INTEGRALISM
One could instead reject the religiously pluralistic state altogether. For a small but vocal number, the antiliberal lessons
that Eliot and others teach should be taken to heart. Liberalism
has failed; the religiously pluralistic society is impossible, and
its replacement should be an explicitly Christian—and, more
specifically, Roman Catholic—nation.164
This version of antiliberalism is known as Catholic integralism, which arose in the nineteenth century as an explicit reaction to modernism. A founding text is Pope Pius IX’s 1864 Syllabus of Errors,165 which “rejected everything from rationalism
and liberalism, to the principles of Church-state separation and
religious freedom.”166 A revived integralism is an outlier in Cath-

163. This, again, is a familiar criticism from earlier liberal-communitarian
debates. See, e.g., Amy Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 308, 318–20 (1985) (explaining how communitarian politics,
touted as an alternative to liberalism, would continue to oppress individuals);
see also Schragger & Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, supra
note 134, at 945–49 (criticizing religious institutionalism for lacking a clear
limit to church power).
164. See, e.g., Gladden Pappin, Toward a Party of the State, AM. AFF., Spring
2019, at 149, 153–56, https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2019/02/toward-a
-party-of-the-state/ [https://perma.cc/U8BC-Q9ZE]; Adrian Vermeule, Integration from Within, AM. AFF., Spring 2018, at 208, https://americanaffairsjournal
.org/2018/02/integration-from-within/ [https://perma.cc/GRS6-S924] (reviewing
DENEEN, supra note 10); Edmund Waldstein, An Integralist Manifesto, FIRST
THINGS (Oct. 2017), https://www.firstthings.com/article/2017/10/an-integralist
-manifesto [https://perma.cc/L3X4-9ATH] (reviewing ANDREW WILLARD JONES,
BEFORE CHURCH AND STATE: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER IN THE SACRAMENTAL
KINGDOM OF ST. LOUIS IX (2017)).
165. Pope Pius IX, Syllabus of Errors (1864), http://www.papalencyclicals
.net/pius09/p9syll.htm [https://perma.cc/PS7E-JZT7].
166. Sarah Shortall, When Catholicism Embraced Modernity, BOS. REV.
(Aug. 10, 2018), http://bostonreview.net/philosophy-religion/sarah-shortall
-when-catholicism-embraced-modernity [https://perma.cc/GG5M-77MX] (reviewing JAMES CHAPPEL, CATHOLIC MODERN: THE CHALLENGE OF TOTALITARIANISM AND THE REMAKING OF THE CHURCH (2018)).
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olic doctrine, especially after the Second Vatican Council endorsed freedom of conscience in the 1960s.167 But antiliberalism’s resurgence has been accompanied by the reassertion of
radical, and reactionary, theological views.168
Catholic integralism calls for the establishment of a confessional state.169 Advocates are unabashed about rejecting religious disestablishment. Consider Patrick Brennan, a law professor contemplating what a Christian constitution in a
predominantly Christian nation might look like. The “defining
mark of a Christian Commonwealth” is that
it submits to Christ the King as the supreme lawgiver. This is traditional Catholic doctrine. A true Christian constitution would take as
its alpha and its omega Christ the King and, at His command, His
Church, and this plainly is not the stuff of garden-variety contemporary political thrust and parry. On the contrary, it is as obvious as the
North Star on a clear night that contemporary conservatives and neocons alike are no more likely than today’s liberals or libertarians to
affirm or even good-naturedly to entertain the thesis I shall defend:
The ultimate end of the project of Christian constitutionalism is to lead
human persons to the supernatural common good, the God of Christian
revelation, but first, in service of that ultimate end, to lead human persons proximately to the natural common good, ‘the virtuous life of the
whole,’ through subordination to the divine law . . . .170

167. Pope Paul VI, Gaudium et Spes [Pastoral Constitution on the Church
in the Modern World] (Dec. 7, 1965), http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_
councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_
en.html [https://perma.cc/SU6W-7GV3] (“Conscience is the most secret core and
sanctuary of man.”).
168. See, e.g., Ash Milton, After Freedom: Catholic Political Theology in the
Age of Liberal Crisis, PALLADIUM: GOVERNANCE FUTURISM (Dec. 26, 2018),
https://palladiummag.com/2018/12/26/after-freedom-catholic-political-theology
-in-the-age-of-liberal-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/2XB9-7YNZ]; Gladden J. Pappin,
Liberalism Against the Church, FIRST THINGS (Feb. 2019), https://www
.firstthings.com/article/2019/02/liberalism-against-the-church [https://perma
.cc/95FH-3DUU] (reviewing ROSENBLATT, supra note 47); Joseph G. Trabbic,
The Catholic Church, the State, and Liberalism, PUB. DISCOURSE (May 2, 2018),
https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2018/05/21405/ [https://perma.cc/KZD2
-PCBJ]
169. See Pink, supra note 24 (“Integralism—the need for a confessional
Catholic state—is part of Catholic teaching about grace.”); see also Edmund
Waldstein, Integralism in Three Sentences, JOSIAS (Oct. 17, 2016), https://
thejosias.com/2016/10/17/integralism-in-three-sentences/ [https://perma.cc/
JX6W-MX6V] (advocating “man’s temporal end is subordinated to his eternal
end” and, thus, “the temporal power must be subordinated to the spiritual
power”).
170. Patrick McKinley Brennan, An Essay on Christian Constitutionalism:
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Brennan is a minority voice—few American Catholics advocate for a confessional state. And yet the antiliberal revival has
generated a serious debate among conservative Catholics about
the reach of the antiliberal critique.171 This is a narrow debate,
to be sure, since all believe that core aspects of actually-existing
liberalism are irredeemable. But some imagine a kind of tense
standoff with the liberal state that retains some core liberal commitments, such as rights of conscience.172
Others see an inevitable clash between civilizations, not unlike Eliot’s description of conflict between Christians and pagans. Adrian Vermeule, a Harvard law professor with
Schmittian sympathies, has emerged as a leading proponent of
this view. Placing himself explicitly within the antiliberal tradition,173 Vermeule claims that liberalism is a religion. The “main
tradition of liberalism,” he argues, “is in fact a liturgy, centred
on a sacramental celebration of the progressive overcoming of
the darkness of bigotry and unreason.”174 Vermeule is not unique
here. This language could come from Schmitt, Eliot, Smith, or
Himmelfarb. It is a trope of the antiliberal canon to decry “the
secularized soteriology of the Enlightenment, the narrative of
Progress.”175
Building in the Divine Style, for the Common Good(s), 16 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 478, 482 (2015).
171. See Adrian Vermeule, As Secular Liberalism Attacks the Church, Catholics Can’t Afford To Be Nostalgic, CATH. HERALD (Jan. 5, 2018), https://
catholicherald.co.uk/commentandblogs/2018/01/05/as-secular-liberalism
-attacks-the-church-catholics-cant-afford-to-be-nostalgic/ [https://perma.cc/
VE33-B9FC] (criticizing Catholic traditionalists for rejecting integralism and
for failing to see that “[t]here is no reason to think that a stable, long-term rapprochement between Catholicism and the liberal state is realistically feasible”);
Edmund Waldstein, Gelysian Dyarchy at Notre Dame, JOSIAS (Nov. 4, 2018),
https://thejosias.com/2018/11/04/gelasian-dyarchy-at-notre-dame/ [https://
perma.cc/495S-CVYM] (discussing a debate at Notre Dame between Catholic
integralists and “Whig Thomist” liberals about the proper response to the American experiment in religious freedom).
172. Cf. Vincent Phillip Muñoz, Defending American Classical Liberalism,
NAT’L REV. (June 11, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/
06/american-classical-liberalism-response-to-radical-catholics/ [https://perma
.cc/UBN8-VCEE] (rejecting “‘radical’ Catholic” critiques of American liberalism
advanced by Deneen, Vermeule, Dreher, and others).
173. See Vermeule, supra note 63 (“[T]he relentless dynamic of liberalism
tends to undermine the ‘peace, security and order’ that liberalism itself promises.”).
174. Vermeule, supra note 171.
175. Vermuele, supra note 22.
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Another standard antiliberal argument is that liberalism
and communism are the twin offspring of the Enlightenment.176
Vermeule follows this script as well, arguing that both ideologies
were “children of the Enlightenment, raised in the same nursery
of the Revolution . . . [with] the same inner logic, the same intellectual structure, and the same dynamics over time.”177 He rejects, as does the antiliberal tradition, any real distinction between the liberal and communist state. The professed
commitment to the freedom of thought and belief that supposedly distinguishes liberal states from communist ones is a chimera. The insidiousness of liberal society is that while it “celebrates toleration, diversity, and free inquiry . . . in practice it
features a spreading social, cultural, and ideological conformity.”178
Liberal individuals are, as is common in this genre, lonely,
desiccated, detached, and searching for meaning in a world that
liberalism has created. “Because liberalism tends to dissolve intermediate institutions and traditional groupings—family, community, church—liberal man craves belonging and membership.”179 Moreover, intellectuals—“freethinkers”180—are misled.
They are liberals “due not just to fear of social reprisals and
shaming, but also to self-deception and the lack of any other comprehensive view that would give them the self-confidence to
think and speak against liberalism.”181
What is to be done about liberalism and the liberal state?
Vermeule rejects those traditionalist conservatives who “hope
for a truce” between Christianity and aggressive liberalism.182
Instead, like Eliot before him, Vermeule advocates a Christian
society—a Catholic state—and he reproaches those antiliberals
who are insufficiently committed to realizing such a new order.
176. See LEGUTKO, supra note 10, at 155–75 (critiquing the Enlightenment
driven development of liberal and communist criticisms of Christianity); CARL
SCHMITT, ROMAN CATHOLICISM AND POLITICAL FORM 34–39 (G.L. Ulmen trans.
& ann., Praeger 1996) (1923) (discussing the development of liberalism and communism following the Enlightenment and positioning both as enemies of Roman
Catholicism).
177. Vermeule, supra note 22.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Vermeule, supra note 171.
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One cannot compromise when salvation is at stake. The “forces
of secular progressive liberalism” are too dangerous and too powerful.183
But how does such a state come about? Here, Vermeule flirts
with the Christian nationalist movements in Poland and Hungary.184 And programmatically, borrowing from Schmitt, Vermeule suggests that Catholics engage in “flexible collaboration”
with “pagan kings and powers”—to use whatever tactics and
make whatever political alliances are necessary to achieve their
aims.185 He urges Christians to engage in politics, but always on
the understanding that “[n]o one temporal ideology, no set political program, can limit the freedom of the Church. As the inheritor and baptizer of the universal pretensions of the Roman Empire, the Church acts in all lands under an infinite variety of
political conditions.”186 What is important is the long-term goal:
“to bear witness to the Lord and to expand his one, holy, Catholic
and apostolic Church to the ends of the earth.”187
183. Id. Liberalism is even responsible for the Catholic Church’s epidemic of
child sex abuse in the twentieth century. The implicit suggestion is that liberalism has corrupted the Church hierarchy; the Church would be better positioned to prevent child sex abuse in a Catholic state. Responding to the claim
that integralists must account for the Catholic Church’s conduct in child abuse
cases, Vermeule writes that “[t]he necessary comparison involves (1) liberal authorities under liberalism; (2) Church authorities under liberalism; and (3)
Church authorities under integralism. Abuses in Boston in the 1970s (e.g.) tell
us something about (2), but little about (3) and nothing at all about (1).” Adrian
Vermeule (@Vermeullarmine), TWITTER (Jan. 11, 2018, 5:02 PM), https://
twitter.com/Vermeullarmine/status/951590066337480736 [https://perma.cc/
8H8J-2QPG]. He also claims that “the Church under integralism has accountability mechanisms it actually lacks under liberalism.” Adrian Vermeule
(@Vermeullarmine), TWITTER (Jan. 11, 2018, 5:09 PM), https://twitter.com/
Vermeullarmine/status/951591842021339138 [https://perma.cc/NY6S-JZ8M].
184. See Adrian Vermeule, Liberalism’s Fear, JOSIAS (May 9, 2018),
https://thejosias.com/2018/05/09/liberalisms-fear/ [https://perma.cc/37LE
-AWUS] (questioning liberal criticism of Poland and Hungary’s new political
regimes); cf. Rick Hills, Adrian Vermeule’s Anti-Liberal Chic?, PRAWFSBLAWG
(May 11, 2018), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/05/adrian
-vermeles-anti-liberal-chic.html [https://perma.cc/CRN5-ZRJU] (suggesting
that Vermeule’s comments may be aimed at simply riling up liberalism’s advocates, not an actual viewpoint).
185. Vermeule, supra note 24; see also Adrian Vermeule, The Ark of Tradition, RUSSELL KIRK CTR.: U. BOOKMAN (Nov. 19, 2017), https://kirkcenter.org/
reviews/the-ark-of-tradition/ [https://perma.cc/93HA-4UZR] (reviewing
SCHMITT, supra note 176).
186. Vermeule, supra note 24.
187. Id.
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In this, Vermeule again echoes Eliot and the long tradition
of religious antiliberalism. Liberalism—whether in the guise of
“modern paganism,” humanism, or secularism—is described as
an ideology as powerful and as all-encompassing as communism
or fascism.188 What follows is that liberalism has to be defeated
at all costs. This view is not appreciably different from the nineteenth century Church’s position under Pope Pius IX. Contemporary integralism is continuous with a long line of anti-modern
thought within the Catholic Church. What is striking is the revival of integralism in the first third of the twenty-first century,
after an over 250-year American history of religious pluralism
and the instantiation of disestablishment and free exercise under the First Amendment.
There is no originalist claim here. Antiliberals are content
to criticize the “Godless” Constitution brought into being by a
group of Enlightenment Founders who rejected church hierarchy
and were skeptical of inherited authority.189 The antiliberal tradition is consciously committed to a longer-term project. Antiliberals tend to measure time in millennia as opposed to centuries, though often they identify the current moment as a
profound turning point and use the existing political regime as
an example of how Western liberal society has lost its way.190
In the present time, the asserted collapse of religious liberty
in the West is the harbinger of liberalism’s corruption. According
to this line of thought, liberals are oppressing Christians and
other orthodox believers, specifically through laws that require
equal treatment of gays and lesbians, the provision of contraceptives and other health care to female employees and their dependents, and the recognition of same-sex marriage.191 The liberal state’s hostility to Christians is a matter of fact for religious
antiliberal writers. They write as if Christians are being directly
and purposefully targeted by the regulatory state. For some antiliberals, it would be enough if Christians could be left alone—
freed from the requirements of civil law in a significant range of
cases. But for integralists like Vermeule, the conflict between
188. See Vermeule, supra note 22 (“The eschaton of radical freedom for all is
inevitable . . . and therefore it is essential that every good citizen accept liberalism (communism) in his heart . . . .”).
189. See Brennan, supra note 170, at 528.
190. See Vermeule, supra note 173 (discussing liberalism’s attempts to
change “settled mores of millennia”).
191. See SMITH, supra note 10, at 282–300.
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Christians and liberals is world-historic, inevitable, and ongoing. And it can only end with a Christian state.192
III. THE COLLAPSE OF CHURCH-STATE DOCTRINE
The antiliberal revival surveyed above is, in large part, a
reflection and response to the sense of present-day cultural siege
on the part of religious conservatives. But it has deeper roots.
Reactionary thought is embedded in the Western political and
philosophical tradition.193 It would be a mistake to dismiss contemporary radical antiliberal diatribes as politically and academically fringe, even if they are not often asserted in polite company. Liberalism’s discontents are a varied and vocal group. And
the asserted crisis of liberalism is not taking place only in academic settings or in the pages (or websites) of religiously conservative periodicals.
For our purposes, the antiliberal revival is important because it is quietly making inroads into constitutional discourse.
There is rarely a directly observable relationship between theory
and practice, but modes of thought can provide justifications for
doctrinal shifts or rationalize them after the fact. Religious antiliberalism is part of a broader discourse that often focuses on
the Supreme Court’s hostility to religion or disregard for religious sensibilities. Antiliberal thought asserts that liberalism
oppresses across all domains of thought and action—in the family, the market, and the state.194 Constitutional doctrine as it has
enforced liberal separationism is a species of that oppression.
Antiliberal critiques thus provide normative and justificatory
support for courts already suspicious of existing separationism.
There is no question that the Supreme Court’s Religion
Clause doctrine has moved sharply against separationism over
the last two decades.195 The general doctrinal pattern has been
192. For further discussion, see generally Micah Schwartzman & Jocelyn
Wilson, The Unreasonableness of Catholic Integralism, SAN DIEGO L. REV.
(Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Paper Series No. 2019-43,
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3436376 (surveying
and criticizing integralist views).
193. See generally HOLMES, supra note 7 (tracing and discussing the roots of
antiliberalism in Western thought).
194. Schwartzman & Wilson, supra note 192, at 14 (discussing “a ‘post-liberal’ or integralist view in which liberalism is seen as a relentless, oppressive,
and theological enemy”).
195. See Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Establishment Clause
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a narrowing of the Establishment Clause and a broadening of
free exercise. With respect to the Establishment Clause, in
American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n, the Court recently held that state sponsorship of a forty-foot Latin cross did
not constitute an impermissible endorsement of Christianity.196
The Court further held that long-standing religious monuments
and practices enjoy a presumption of constitutionality.197 Similarly, in Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to a town’s practice of opening
board meetings with explicitly sectarian and mainly Christian
prayers.198 In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer,
the Court held that the government must fund a church playground resurfacing project on equal terms as nonreligious
schools,199 raising the possibility of mandatory funding for religious schools’ core mission.200
On the free exercise side, by contrast, the doctrine has been
expansionist. In Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission, the Court invalidated application of Colorado’s antidiscrimination law to a Christian baker who denied service to
a gay couple,201 opening the door to the possibility of broader religious exemptions from civil rights law. In Burwell v. Hobby
Inversion and the Bladensburg Cross Case, in AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2018–2019, at 21, 24 (2019).
196. 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
197. Id. at 2085.
198. 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
199. 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
200. The Court’s recent certiorari decisions suggest that some members may
be ready to expand this precedent. In one case, the Montana Supreme Court
struck down a state law requiring tax credits for religious education because it
violated the state’s constitution. The Court granted certiorari for an appeal
claiming that the decision violates the Free Exercise Clause by excluding religious education. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603 (Mont. 2018),
cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2777 (2019). In another case, the Court denied certiorari
from a New Jersey Supreme Court decision upholding a historic preservation
program that excluded religious buildings. Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch, wrote a statement agreeing with the denial on procedural grounds, but indicated his view that the state’s actions violated the Free
Exercise Clause. Morris Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Freedom from Religion Found., 139 S. Ct. 909, 909 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting
the denial of certiorari) (mem.) (“In my view, the decision of the New Jersey
Supreme Court is in serious tension with this Court’s religious equality precedents.”).
201. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
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Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court applied the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to a for-profit corporation and granted a religious exemption from federal regulations mandating coverage
of contraception in health insurance policies for employees.202
And in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC,
the Court held that churches are immune from employment discrimination suits by “ministers” and that the category of minister should be construed broadly to include a teacher of mostly
secular subjects.203
Despite the Court’s supposed hostility toward religion, the
“pro-religion” party has been on the winning side of almost all of
the First Amendment and statutory free exercise cases that the
Court has heard in the last decade. A glaring exception is Trump
v. Hawaii,204 the travel ban case, which rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to an immigration ban motivated by the
President’s explicit animus toward Muslims.205
We are not suggesting that each of these cases taken individually represents a break with liberal principles. These cases
have been decided for the most part within the terms of liberal
discourse. The Court recites and applies the procedural principles of neutrality, nondiscrimination, and private choice.206 But
that discourse is clearly under strain, creating inconsistencies
that suggest a larger cultural or attitudinal shift rather than a
principled application of settled principles. The Court’s willingness to remake church-state jurisprudence reflects a broader critique of liberal separationism. The role of that critique in the political economy of the Religion Clauses is addressed below in
Part IV. But before turning to the future of church-state jurisprudence, we first identify the doctrinal tensions that suggest its
more recent collapse.
A. RELIGION’S SPECIALNESS
We start with a basic anomaly. The Supreme Court’s Religion Clause decisions are conflicted over whether religious people, organizations, and activities must be accorded the same

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

573 U.S. 682 (2014).
565 U.S. 171 (2012).
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 168–69.
See infra Part IV.D.
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treatment as their nonreligious analogs, or whether those activities, organizations, and people are meant to receive special
treatment. Whether religion is “special” shows up doctrinally in
a number of ways.207 The funding cases ask whether religious
activities can or must receive funding from the government on
equal terms with equivalent secular activities.208 The exemptions
cases ask whether religiously motivated actors are entitled to receive exemptions from general laws that nonreligious individuals do not receive.209 And the government speech cases ask
whether the government can make religious statements or give
religious reasons for laws on the same basis as it makes nonreligious statements or gives secular reasons for laws.210 Religion is
special to the extent it receives either better or worse treatment
compared to its secular analog.211 In the past, the Establishment
Clause has been read to disallow significant government funding
of religious activities,212 to limit government religious speech,213
and to prohibit laws that lack a predominant secular purpose.214
The Free Exercise Clause has been read to permit215 and sometimes to require religious exemptions from laws that otherwise
207. See Schwartzman, supra note 27, at 1353–55.
208. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct.
2012 (2017); Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law
v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004); see also
2 GREENAWALT, supra note 39, at 194–206 (discussing cases regarding equal
access to public facilities for religious activities); Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263 (2008).
209. Compare Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (applying RFRA to require a religious exemption from the contraception mandate
for a religious for-profit corporation), with March for Life v. Burwell, 128 F.
Supp. 3d 116 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (applying the Equal Protection Clause to require
an exemption from the contraception mandate for a secular nonprofit).
210. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014); McCreary
County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530
U.S. 290 (2000); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Stone v. Graham,
449 U.S. 39 (1980).
211. See Schwartzman, supra note 27, at 1353.
212. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (invalidating state
law that provided government funding to reimburse private religious schools for
textbooks and teacher salaries).
213. See, e.g., Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 317 (upholding Establishment Clause
challenge to public school’s prayer practice at high school football games).
214. See, e.g., McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 881 (declaring that the practice
of displaying the Ten Commandments in county courthouses was unconstitutional because it lacked a secular purpose).
215. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
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bind nonreligious actors.216 Religion is thus specially disabled,
but also specially protected.217
This regime, however, has been collapsing for some time under pressure from a general nondiscrimination principle.218 Most
recently in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer,
the Court struck down a state law that prevented government
funding of religious enterprises in the context of playground resurfacing.219 Trinity Lutheran follows a line of cases in the 1990s,
culminating in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,220 that permitted but
did not require indirect state funding of religious schools through
a school voucher program.221 Zelman rejected the reasoning of a
previous line of cases holding that funding religious schools, except under narrow circumstances, violated the Establishment
Clause.222 Trinity Lutheran is three steps removed from those
precedents. The Court has moved from a regime that disallowed
most kinds of direct funding to a regime that permitted indirect
funding and now to a regime that requires direct funding. And
(1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause allows but does not require religious exemptions from neutral and generally applicable laws). Although the
Court’s decision in Smith did not give especially favorable treatment to religion,
it left in place earlier lines of cases that provided exemptions and permitted the
development of federal statutes that have granted significant special protections for religious free exercise, even at the cost of significant harms to third
parties. See infra notes 315–16 and accompanying text; see also NeJaime &
Siegel, supra note 6, at 2562–67; Sepper, supra note 5, at 1505–07. And even so,
there has been constant pressure from religious conservatives in recent years
to overturn Smith. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 162–63 (discussing efforts to overrule Smith).
216. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012) (recognizing ministerial exception in part under
the Free Exercise Clause); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (granting
religious exemption from compulsory school attendance law); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (granting religious exemption for unemployment compensation benefits).
217. See Schwartzman, supra note 27, at 1356–58.
218. This doctrinal trajectory was noticed already more than a decade ago.
See Feldman, supra note 1, at 676.
219. 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
220. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
221. See 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 39, at 405–14 (surveying the permissive
funding cases leading up to the Court’s decision in Zelman).
222. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 917, 919 (2003) (“Zelman represents the most recent and dramatic move
away from Separationism.”).
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though the Court put to the side whether such funding is required outside the context of playground resurfacing,223 the direction of the doctrine is clear.224
The funding cases are driven by a seemingly compelling antidiscrimination norm, according to which religious organizations that look just like secular ones should not be penalized by
restrictions on government funding. Religious traditionalists
and conservatives have long chafed against funding restrictions,
especially with regards to private religious schools.225 They have
asserted, now with some success, that a basic equal protection
theory should apply to such discriminations.226
Similarly, some have argued that religious reasons should
be treated the same as secular reasons in providing legitimate
grounds for justifying law.227 Here we can see an application of
the antiliberal critique of the secular/religious divide. If religious
argument is no different from other kinds of ideological argument, then it should be included on the same terms in the political domain. The rejection of the secular/religious distinction—a
staple of liberal thought—means that if the state can rely on secular values, whether in justifying laws or in expressing those
justifications through government speech, it should be able to
appeal to religious convictions as well.
This equal treatment regime, however, does not seem to
hold when it comes to government regulation of religion. When
laws burden religion, as opposed to funding or promoting it, a
different set of concerns emerge. Religious belief is treated as
unique and uniquely vulnerable to government repression. Arguments are often made that religious claims are special because

223. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024 n.3 (“This case involves express
discrimination based on religious identity with respect to playground resurfacing. We do not address religious uses of funding or other forms of discrimination.”).
224. See Laycock, supra note 1, at 137–42.
225. See FELDMAN, supra note 62, at 215; Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at
328–52.
226. See, e.g., Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution:
An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 311, 358–62 (1986).
227. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 88, at 655–56; Wolterstorff, supra note
83, at 180.
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religious persons are responding to a higher law.228 Religious accommodationists assert that conflicts between secular and religious laws are especially and uniquely painful for them.229 They
also claim that religious institutions, unlike secular analogs,
have a particular and special status, legally and normatively.230
Under liberal theory, churches are voluntary associations, like
other associations. But under institutionalist or corporatist theories, churches are much more than that.231
While religion is not special for purposes of funding, government speech, or justifying legislation, it does appear to be special
for purposes of religious exemptions.232 For example, in holding
that religious organizations are exempt from antidiscrimination
laws when making employment decisions about ministers, the
Supreme Court declared that “the text of the First Amendment
itself . . . gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations”233—a clear nod to religious institutionalism.234 The

228. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, “Secular Purpose,” Accommodations, and
Why Religion Is Special (Enough), 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 24, 36–37
(2013); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 28–30 (2000); Michael Stokes Paulsen, God Is Great, Garvey Is
Good: Making Sense of Religious Freedom, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1597, 1611
(1997); Nicholas Wolterstorff, A Religious Argument for the Civil Right to Freedom of Religious Exercise, Drawn from American History, 36 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 535, 555 (2001).
229. GARVEY, supra note 142, at 54.
230. See BRADY, supra note 27, at 321–24; Michael W. McConnell, Why Protect Religious Freedom?, 123 YALE L.J. 770, 777 n.34 (2013) (reviewing BRIAN
LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2012)).
231. See supra Part II.C.
232. One of us has described this combination of views under the label of
“inclusive accommodation.” Schwartzman, supra note 27, at 1359. According to
this view, religion is not to be treated specially for purposes of the political process. It must be included like any other nonreligious ethical or philosophical
view. But religion warrants special treatment with respect to granting accommodations. At the core of this view is a deep asymmetry in the treatment of
religion—sometimes religion is special, and sometimes it is not. And the question always for inclusive accommodationists is whether asymmetry can be justified. See id. at 1378–85 (arguing that none of the arguments offered for inclusive accommodation “seem capable of resolving this underlying theoretical
inconsistency”).
233. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565
U.S. 171, 189 (2012).
234. Religious institutionalists welcomed Hosanna-Tabor as confirming that
their views now have a firmer foothold within constitutional doctrine. See, e.g.,
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Court has also applied RFRA and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) to protect the rights of
religious believers, holding that “[r]eligious accommodations . . . need not ‘come packaged with benefits to secular entities.’”235 The Court has found no difficulty extending religious
exemptions to large for-profit corporations, with the result that
the religious owners of Hobby Lobby can opt-out of complying
with a federal health care mandate.236 Companies and persons
with equivalent secular conscientious objections, however, generally do not receive such beneficial treatment under RFRA,
RLUIPA, or the First Amendment.237
By contrast with the emerging regime, the separationist
church-state settlement maintained a balance in treating religion distinctively. It disallowed government support for religious
activities, but it also required exemptions for religious dissenters.238 Religion was exceptional in two ways. Religiously motivated activities were burdened to the extent that the government could not directly support them, either through funding or
through the enactment of laws directed to advance religious purposes. At the same time, certain regulations that burdened religious conscientious objectors were lifted.
The language of equal treatment, however, has now been
put to one-sided use, most obviously in the funding context.
Equal treatment arguments fit comfortably in a liberal antidiscrimination schema; government should treat religious and nonreligious citizens with equal regard.239 But this one-sided equal
Richard W. Garnett, The Worms and the Octopus: Religious Freedom, Pluralism, and Conservatism, in NOMOS LVI: AMERICAN CONSERVATISM 160, 175–76
(Sanford V. Levinson et al. eds., 2016).
235. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005) (quoting Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327, 338 (1987)).
236. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
237. See, e.g., Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Sec. Dep’t Health & Human Servs.,
867 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2017) (rejecting statutory and constitutional claims for
exemption from the federal contraception mandate for secular, non-profit, antiabortion organizations).
238. See Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102
YALE L.J. 1611, 1633–39 (1993); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal
Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 222 (1992). But see Schwartzman, supra note
27, at 1390–94 (criticizing this symmetrical or balancing view under the label
of “exclusive accommodation”).
239. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 15, at 28–31; TEBBE, supra note
16, at 71–73.
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treatment raises a concern that what is really happening is
something else: that religious citizens receive more favorable
treatment across the scope of government activities than do nonreligious citizens.
Moreover, the asymmetrical application of the equal treatment principle is difficult if not impossible to defend on the basis
of liberal principles.240 What differentiates religious conscientious objectors from nonreligious ones, who may have equally
deeply felt objections to a coercive law? Is there not an equal protection problem when the religious owners of Hobby Lobby can
be exempted from the requirement to provide contraception coverage to their employees, but the nonreligious owners of a company who have secular conscientious objections to the same law
cannot?241 If it is suspect for government to distribute benefits
and burdens based on a citizen’s source of belief, why does that
suspicion only apply to laws that disfavor religious persons?
This lack of symmetry has been defended by some on the
grounds that religion is so important that religious actors should
be supported by the state as well as exempted from the state’s
laws.242 Religious believers can encourage the government to
adopt religiously motivated laws, to provide monies to religious
persons and organizations, and to express or endorse religious
convictions in public just as they might express or endorse nonreligious views. At the same time, they are entitled to be exempt
from government regulation in many cases. Within the discourse
of equal treatment, however, this dual treatment of religious believers is puzzling. One needs a theory of religion and its privileged place to justify treating citizens so differently on account
of the nature of their beliefs. A liberal account—whatever the
rhetoric of equal treatment—has (and should have) difficulty doing so. The demands of equality are too obvious.
A regime of equal treatment is available. It is contained in
the human rights doctrines that demand respect for rights of

240. See Schwartzman, supra note 27, at 1377–401.
241. Compare, e.g., Real Alternatives, 867 F.3d at 348–53 (denying an Equal
Protection Clause challenge for an exemption from the contraception mandate
for a secular nonprofit), with March for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116,
126–28 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (applying the Equal Protection Clause to require an
exemption from the contraception mandate for a secular nonprofit).
242. See Thomas C. Berg, Masterpiece Cakeshop: A Romer for Religious Objectors, 2017–2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 139, 165–66 (2018).
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conscience, whether religious in nature or otherwise.243 In the
context of American constitutional law, Christopher Eisgruber
and Larry Sager have promoted a liberal theory of equal concern
and respect for all citizens regardless of the nature of their
deeply held convictions.244 It is symmetrical insofar as it treats
religious and nonreligious claims equally for purposes of both
free exercise and disestablishment.245 Eisgruber and Sager are
persuasive that religious asymmetry is indefensible. They and
others have urged treating religious claims like other comparable ethical claims in evaluating whether the government is required or permitted to provide support, endorsement, or exemptions. Secular and religious claims alike would be tested against
the same criteria.246
The doctrine is moving away from such symmetry, however.
With respect to exemptions, the doctrine had been moving toward regulatory equality. In Employment Division, Department
of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,247 decided almost thirty
years ago, the Court limited the special treatment of religious
believers under the First Amendment when it held that the Free
Exercise Clause does not require exemptions when a law is neutral and generally applicable. Since Smith was decided, however,
it has been roundly criticized, and mostly replaced by statutory
protections for religious believers.248 The Court has also found
its own ways around Smith. Hosanna-Tabor barely engaged
with Smith’s reasoning even as the ministerial exception limits
243. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY: HUMAN
RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 84–85 (2017) (arguing for a human right of “moral freedom” that would extend a regime of religious exemptions to those with nonreligious claims of conscience); Schwartzman, Religion
as a Legal Proxy, supra note 16, at 1099–101.
244. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 15, at 18–20.
245. Schwartzman, supra note 27, at 1374–77 (discussing Eisgruber and
Sager’s theory as a version of “inclusive nonaccommodation,” which “takes as
its fundamental premise the equality of religious and secular moral views”).
246. Which is not to say that we agree entirely with Eisgruber and Sager’s
view, only that we share their basic premise about the need for equal treatment
of religious and nonreligious ethical and philosophical doctrines. See Schwartzman, supra note 27, at 1395–401 (arguing for an alternative to Eisgruber and
Sager’s account because of concerns about the inclusion of religious convictions
as grounds for legal decision making).
247. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
248. On the rise and fall and rise again of religious accommodations, see Ira
C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35, 35 (2014).
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Smith’s central holding.249 As noted above, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor seemed to endorse an institutionalist conception of
religious freedom. Also, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, which invalidated the application of a neutral and generally applicable public accommodations law, the Court avoided Smith by holding
that the civil rights law had not been applied neutrally.250
Smith is in decline if not dead.251 But while Smith collapses,
equal treatment arguments have gained traction in the funding
area. In other words, the equal treatment principle is being deployed in cases that benefit religious actors, but not where it
works against them.
A liberal account of the Religion Clauses does not readily
permit this double-standard.252 But as we have already described, antiliberal thought draws a relevant distinction between transcendent religiosity, which characterizes the beliefs
of “Christians” and other “devout” believers, and secularized “pagans,” or those who accept immanent conceptions of value.253 It
is permissible, under this view, to treat the former more favorably than the latter, as their commitments are of a different kind.
There is no inconsistency on this account, as the principle of
equality simply does not apply as between the two groups.
In addition, antiliberal theories provide a justification for
religious favoritism, in part as compensation for a background

249. See Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 951, 954–56
(2012) (criticizing the Court’s attempt to distinguish Smith); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1265, 1292 (2017)
(describing the Court’s treatment of Smith as a “woefully inadequate explanation of why Smith is not fatal to the ministerial exception”).
250. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 138–45, 154–57 (criticizing the Court’s holding that the state failed to apply its public accommodations law in a manner consistent with religious neutrality).
251. See id. at 162 (noting that in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Justice Gorsuch
and Justice Alito signaled their interest in reversing Smith). And just in case
the signal in Masterpiece Cakeshop was not received, less than a year later, Justice Alito—this time joined by Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh—issued another statement effectively inviting challenges to Smith. See Kennedy
v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634, 637 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring).
252. See supra Part I.
253. See supra Part II.B.
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liberal regime that is purportedly biased against religious believers.254 The antiliberal critique sets the stage for a regime of separate spheres or institutional sovereignty. Once one embraces
the idea that liberalism is a religion, one can treat the liberal
state and the church as akin to competing religious sovereigns.
The liberal regime of equal treatment is replaced with, or subordinated to, an antiliberal regime of church freedom.
B. NEUTRALITY
The problem of religion’s specialness is related to the question of what constitutes government “neutrality” concerning religion. The Court’s Religion Clause decisions are written in
terms of liberal principles, with religious neutrality perhaps
foremost among them. But the meaning of neutrality has been a
moving target, similar to the ways that equal treatment has
been inconsistently applied. Here again, “neutrality” is being deployed to instantiate a religion-favoring regime, one that undercuts liberal premises rather than enforces them.
First, consider the requirements for neutrality recently debated in Masterpiece Cakeshop.255 Under Smith, neutral laws of
general applicability do not give rise to a free exercise claim for
an exemption.256 One would have thought that a public accommodations law that applied to gays and lesbians would be such
a law. Civil rights laws are general and apply to religious as well
as nonreligious parties; on their face, there is no targeting of a
particular religion or religion in general.257

254. See supra Part II.A.
255. Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1731 (2018).
256. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878
(1990).
257. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy affirmed that the state’s public
accommodation is facially neutral and generally applicable. See Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727 (“[I]t is a general rule that such [religious and
philosophical] objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the
economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable public accommodations law.”
(emphasis added)); see also Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 154–57
(defending the neutrality of Colorado’s public accommodations law, both facially
and as applied in Masterpiece Cakeshop).
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Nevertheless, in considering the baker’s claim for a religious
exemption, the Court accepted that the state’s public accommodations law had not been applied neutrally.258 Jack Phillips, the
baker who refused to bake a cake for a gay couple’s wedding, argued that the state had discriminated against him and expressed
hostility toward his religious convictions. That was, in part, because the Colorado Civil Rights Division rejected a religious discrimination claim brought by another baker—William Jack—
who had asked three different bakers to make cakes with antigay marriage expressions. Phillips claimed that forcing him to
bake a cake celebrating a gay marriage but not forcing other bakers to bake cakes denigrating such marriage was disparate treatment.259
What version of neutrality does this violate? The Court’s
free speech doctrine holds that the government cannot favor
some messages over others. If Colorado were regulating bakers’
messages, permitting bakers to deny service for anti-gay messages, but not the opposite, would violate a neutrality principle.260 But Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act regulates the
grounds for denial of service, not speech.261 Private parties are
not barred from denying service on the basis of message; what
they are not allowed to do is deny service based on a protected
class.262 Phillips denied service based on the protected status of
his customers; Jack was denied service based on the otherwise
unprotected content of his requested expression.263
That the Court accepted Phillips’s disparate treatment
claim, however, suggests the increasing malleability of neutrality. Civil rights law could not exist if it could not differentiate

258. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.
259. Brief for Petitioners at 39–44, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(No. 16-111).
260. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1733–34.
261. Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 143–45.
262. See id. at 154–55 (“[Civil rights laws] apply only to denial of service on
the basis of certain protected characteristics, such as race, ethnicity, religion,
and sexual orientation. They do not prohibit a baker from refusing to make a
cake on grounds of politics (for example, Nazi cakes), vulgarity (penis-shaped
cakes), or aesthetics (red velvet armadillo cakes).” (citation omitted)).
263. Id.
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between permissible grounds for denials of service and impermissible ones.264 The state can presumably choose to use its public accommodation laws to protect gays and lesbians but not protect Nazis, Republicans, vegans, nudists, or haters of LGBT
people. If neutrality requires that all group identities that might
be associated with a particular product or service (a gay cake, a
Nazi cake, a vegan cake) be protected equally, it will be quite
difficult to adopt any civil rights laws at all. Neutrality would
require that Nazis cannot be refused service if African-Americans cannot be refused service. This result follows from importing speech doctrine’s viewpoint neutrality into public accommodations law.
Neutrality, improperly conceived or applied, can be a destroyer of law. We witnessed this effect during the Lochner era
when the Court required economic legislation to be evenhanded.265 Free speech law also contains within it the means of
law’s destruction. Most action involves speech, and so most legal
regulation can be reimagined as the regulation of speech.266 The
demand that the state be viewpoint neutral when it regulates
acts that are infused with speech can lead to law’s demise.267
Demands for free exercise neutrality exhibit a similar
power. If every legal regulation impinges on a religious or ideological belief, then no regulation is evenhanded. The law will affect some kinds of believers more than others. Civil rights laws
protecting African-Americans will be non-neutral with regards

264. Id. at 145 (“If distinguishing between lawful denials of service and unlawful discrimination is impermissible, then the Supreme Court has destroyed
civil rights law sub silentio.”).
265. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 60–62 (1905); see also 2 G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 404–12 (2016).
266. See Leslie Kendrick, Use Your Words: On the “Speech” in “Freedom of
Speech,” 116 MICH. L. REV. 667, 675–76 (2018) (noting the inexorable expansion
of activities that courts and litigants have found to implicate speech).
267. This phenomenon, sometimes described as free speech or First Amendment Lochnerism, has been much discussed and heavily criticized in recent
years. See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1199, 1212–18 (2015); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016
WIS. L. REV. 133, 176–91 (2016); Howard M. Wasserman, Bartnicki as Lochner:
Some Thoughts on First Amendment Lochnerism, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 421, 439–
56 (2006).
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to Christians who believe in white supremacy unless religious white supremacists also receive protection.268 We have
fallen into Wechsler’s Brown v. Board of Education-destroying
“neutral principles” trap.269
Another meaning of religious neutrality will also be offended
by most law. If the state cannot influence the religious choices of
its citizens, even incidentally, then any funding or regulatory
choice that has the effect of favoring a particular ideology or religious doctrine will be non-neutral. For example, religious traditionalists have long argued that public funding of secular
schools disfavors those who prefer or require that their children
receive a religious education.270 Secularists receive an education
paid for by the state, while the devout are required to pay for
private schools. According to the demands of this account of neutrality, the public school system is non-neutral with regards to
religion, and certainly so if one considers a secular education to
be religious.271 Indeed, any other funding or regulatory choice
that might influence or coerce religiously inspired action will be
non-neutral. Since any and all human activities can be undertaken for religious reasons, the state’s regulation of any activity
can be reframed as disparate treatment. This form of neutrality,

268. The Court rejected this possibility in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (denying as “patently frivolous” a free
exercise challenge brought by a restaurant owner who refused service to African
Americans).
269. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). Our response, perhaps unsurprisingly, follows
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
421 (1960); see also Lawrence G. Sager & Nelson Tebbe, The Reality Principle,
34 CONST. COMMENT. 171, 172 (2019) (defending the religious neutrality of public accommodation laws by developing Black’s response to Wechsler in the context of Masterpiece Cakeshop).
270. See, e.g., Mozert v. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1058–59 (6th Cir. 1987)
(holding that public schools can require religious students to read materials that
offend those students or their parents’ religious beliefs); FELDMAN, supra note
62, at 90–92; Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out”:
Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106
HARV. L. REV. 581, 589–609 (1993).
271. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the Equal
Protection Clause: Why the Constitution Requires School Vouchers, 65 FL. L.
REV. 909, 1047–59 (2013) (arguing states violate the First and Fourteenth
Amendments by discriminating on the basis of religion in operating secular public schools as taxpayer-funded monopolies).

1396

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:1341

sometimes described as “neutrality of effect,”272 again vitiates
law.
Hobby Lobby provides a further example of how the principle of neutrality can be manipulated to undermine legal regulation. Consider the argument that the contraception mandate was
not a neutral and generally applicable law under Smith and
should therefore have triggered strict scrutiny under the Free
Exercise Clause. Like many employment regulations, the contraception mandate applied differently to large and small employers.273 The regulations also contained provisions that required
implementation over time, exempting employers with grandfathered plans from the mandate.274 Hobby Lobby argued that the
law was not neutral or generally applicable because it contained
such exceptions, even though these exceptions had nothing to do
with religion.275 Douglas Laycock and others have argued that a
law is non-neutral with respect to religion if it contains even a
single secular exception that undermines the purpose of the
law.276 This is an almost insurmountable barrier to regulation.277
If deregulation is the goal, then neutrality’s severe demands
can be deployed to accomplish it. But here again, neutrality is
being used selectively. Neutrality is much less demanding when
the Court considers government religious speech under the Establishment Clause. In both Town of Greece and American Legion the Court held that specifically Christian government

272. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 12, at 191–94 (distinguishing between neutrality of aim and neutrality of effect and rejecting the
latter).
273. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014)
(describing exempt and non-exempt employers for the contraception mandate).
274. Id. at 2764.
275. See id. at 2763–64.
276. See Douglas Laycock & Steven T. Collis, Generally Applicable Law and
the Free Exercise of Religion, 95 NEB. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2016) (“The question is
whether a single secular analogy is not regulated. The right to free exercise of
religion is a right to be treated like the most favored analogous secular conduct.”).
277. See Colin Devine, A Critique of the Secular Exceptions Approach to Religious Exemptions, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1348, 1352 (2015) (“If religious exemptions must be granted from any law with secular exceptions, they will be
granted from nearly every law.”).
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speech is permissible.278 Neutrality was no obstacle in those
cases to the state’s religious preferentialism.279
Antiliberal theories provide a basis for such selectivity. Antiliberals often assert that the state has never been neutral
among competing comprehensive doctrines.280 In their view, liberalism and its variants—paganism and secularism—constitute
the existing political and religious orthodoxy.281 Religious libertarianism in the exemption context is thus an appropriate corrective to an already-existing bias.282
C. ANIMUS
The basic idea underlying equal treatment, non-discrimination, and neutrality is that the state should not favor one religious denomination over another. This is a central principle of
disestablishment: the notion that a citizen’s political and economic status is not tied to her religious belief and affiliation or
non-belief and non-affiliation.283
Like all the core concepts of the Court’s Religion Clause jurisprudence, this principle is also under strain. Consider Justice
Antonin Scalia’s stated preference for monotheism.284 Before his
death, Justice Scalia promoted a form of religious identity politics, observing that the government could support a monotheistic
civic-religious culture.285 This “Judeo-Christian” culture possibly
included Muslims as monotheists, though it certainly did not include non-monotheistic religions or nonbelievers.286
278. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2974 (2019); Town
of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 585, 591 (2014).
279. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 195, at 55 (“[T]he Court’s
doctrine is paving the way for a certain kind of religious preferentialism.”).
280. See supra Part II.A.
281. See supra Parts II.A–B.
282. See Sepper, supra note 5, at 1508–12 (discussing “economic libertarianism in a religious garb”).
283. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 637–38 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]hat
remarkable guarantee [of the Establishment Clause] means at least this much:
When the citizens of this country approach their government, they do so only as
Americans, not as members of one faith or another.”); TEBBE, supra note 16, at
99–102.
284. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 893–95 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 893 (“With respect to public acknowledgment of religious belief,
it is entirely clear from our Nation’s historical practices that the Establishment
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Justice Scalia appeared quite comfortable with assimilating
all religions into a background Christian culture. At one point,
he claimed that a cross in the context of a war memorial was a
universal symbol for fallen soldiers, including Jewish war
dead.287 The Court adopted that same view in its decision in
American Legion, holding that the Bladensburg Peace Cross was
erected as a secular symbol of veterans who died in World War I
and not as an endorsement of Christianity.288 In Town of Greece,
the Court permitted a town to open its council meetings with
predominantly sectarian Christian prayers,289 suggesting a tolerance for a certain Christian preferentialism. Echoes of Justice
Brewer’s 1892 claim that “this is a Christian nation”290 can be
heard.291
In these recent cases, the Court has rejected application of
Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test, which had been applied to
previous religious display cases.292 Under that test, the state is
forbidden “from making adherence to a religion relevant in any
Clause permits this disregard of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of devout atheists.”).
287. At oral argument in Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010), which involved an Establishment Clause challenge to a Latin cross on federal land, Justice Scalia expressed indignation at the idea that a crucifix does not represent
Jewish war dead. In an exchange with Peter Eliasberg, a Jewish lawyer representing the ACLU, Justice Scalia said, “I don’t think you can leap . . . to the
conclusion that the only war dead that the cross honors are the Christian war
dead. I think that’s an outrageous conclusion.” Transcript of Oral Argument at
39, Salazar, 559 U.S. 700 (No. 08-472); see Caroline Mala Corbin, Justice Scalia,
the Establishment Clause, and Christian Privilege, 15 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
185, 200–02 (2017) (using Justice Scalia’s comments during the Salazar oral
argument to demonstrate Christian privilege).
288. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2019).
289. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 570, 585 (2014).
290. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
291. Cf. Mark Tushnet, Religion and the Roberts Court: The Limits of Religious Pluralism in Constitutional Law, in RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 133, at 465 (arguing that under the “Roberts Court’s approach
to the Religion Clauses: Christianity is the unmarked religion”).
292. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O’Connor,
J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688–89 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); see also TEBBE, supra note 16, at 98–112 (defending a principle of
government nonendorsement, including limits on government religious speech);
Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1545–51 (2000) (interpreting the endorsement test as a prohibition on expressive harms with respect to religious
status).
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way to a person’s standing in the political community.”293 The
government violates this doctrine when it “sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community.”294 That principle appears to be moribund
after American Legion and Town of Greece.
So, too, animus doctrine holds that the government cannot
engage in acts driven by animus toward a particular religion or
religious group.295 A species of equal protection law,296 animus
doctrine holds that hostility or prejudice toward a religious denomination or practice cannot serve as an appropriate basis of
lawmaking.297 The selective application of animus doctrine, however, suggests that it also is a concept that has lost its conventional meaning.
Consider the inconsistent application of animus in Trump v.
Hawaii, the travel ban case, when compared to its application in
Masterpiece Cakeshop, the wedding-vendor case. Along with the
dissenters in Trump v. Hawaii,298 commentators have repeatedly noted the striking disparity.299 In two cases decided in the
same term, the Court was tasked with determining whether a
government decision was animated by religious prejudice. In
293. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 625 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
294. Id. at 625 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch, 466 U.S. at 688).
295. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523–24
(1993).
296. See WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN
THE LAW 169 (2017); Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from
Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 183–84.
297. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 137 (“Lukumi stands for
a basic constitutional principle, which is that the government may not act on
the basis of animosity toward religion.”).
298. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2446–47 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“But unlike in Masterpiece, where a state civil rights commission was
found to have acted without ‘the neutrality that the Free Exercise Clause requires,’ the government actors in this case will not be held accountable for
breaching the First Amendment’s guarantee of religious neutrality and tolerance.” (citation omitted)).
299. See, e.g., Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 168–69 (arguing
that Trump v. Hawaii “undermined the credibility of the principles articulated
in Masterpiece,” prohibiting public officials from acting on the basis of animus
and expressing hostility toward religion); Ilya Somin, The Supreme Court’s Indefensible Double Standard in the Travel-Ban Case and Masterpiece Cakeshop,
VOX (June 27, 2018, 9:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/6/27/
17509248/travel-ban-religious-discrimination-christian-muslim-double
-standard [https://perma.cc/34XW-9ZJG].
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Trump v. Hawaii, the Court had before it numerous and extensive statements from the President of the United States, who
made clear that his executive order banning immigration from
Muslim-majority countries was intended to prevent Muslims
from entering the United States.300 The President did not hide
the fact that the purpose and intent was to enact a “Muslim ban.”
As a presidential candidate, he called “for a total and complete
shutdown of Muslims entering the United States,”301 and after
taking office, as Justice Sotomayor correctly concluded, “he has
continued to make remarks that a reasonable observer would
view as an unrelenting attack on the Muslim religion and its followers.”302 The Supreme Court, however, refused to apply animus doctrine to the President’s actions. It simply disregarded
the significance of his statements in affirming his use of executive authority to issue the travel ban.303
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, by contrast, the Court went out of
its way to find animus toward the Christian baker seeking an
exemption from Colorado’s public accommodation laws.304 What
did the Court point to as evidence of religious hostility? Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion cites two instances of individual Colorado Civil Rights Commissioners opining about how religious
belief intersects with public law.305 In the first, a Commissioner
observed that businesses open to the public need to “compromise.”306 In the second, a Commissioner said that “[f]reedom of
300. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 352 (4th
Cir. 2018) (Harris, J., concurring) (“This case is remarkable because it features
just that: a governmental decisionmaker using his own direct communications
with the public to broadcast — repeatedly, and throughout the course of this
litigation — an anti-Muslim purpose tied specifically to the challenged action. . . . [T]his is not a case in which we need indulge in ‘judicial psychoanalysis’
of motive. It is all out in the open.” (citations omitted)), vacated and remanded,
138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018) (mem.).
301. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
302. Id. at 2439.
303. Id. at 2418 (majority opinion) (“But the issue before us is not whether
to denounce the statements. It is instead the significance of those statements in
reviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on its face, addressing a matter
within the core of executive responsibility. In doing so, we must consider not
only the statements of a particular President, but also the authority of the Presidency itself.”).
304. See Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1729, 1731–32 (2018).
305. Id. at 1729.
306. Id.
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religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination.”307 Combining these statements with the commission’s
“disparate treatment” of William Jack, who had requested the
anti-gay marriage cakes, the Court concluded that the process of
adjudicating the discrimination claim was unconstitutionally
tainted by hostility toward religion.308
Masterpiece Cakeshop suggests that even a modicum of religious animus should doom the application of an otherwise facially neutral law.309 In Masterpiece Cakeshop, however, the asserted bias of Colorado’s process is hardly convincing. The
majority opinion and Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence assert that
Christian conservatives were targeted by the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission.310 But there is no evidence—no legislative
statements or statements regarding selective enforcement—that
the antidiscrimination law or the Commission’s enforcement of
that law were meant to target a specific religious group.311 The
Court’s justification for looking behind the application of an otherwise neutral and general antidiscrimination law is weak. The
rationale seems to be that applying the antidiscrimination law
to religious traditionalists, and not to those who oppose LGBT
discrimination, evidences bad motive or unequal treatment.
But compare Trump’s travel ban, for which the evidence of
anti-Muslim animus is overwhelming.312 The Court ignores that
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1731–32.
309. See id.
310. Id. at 1730–32; id. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
311. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 145 (“In holding that
the Commission failed to treat Phillips’s claims with neutrality and respect, the
Court improperly applied free exercise doctrine to the facts of the case, finding
unconstitutional hostility and intolerance where there were none.”); see also
Bernard Bell, A Lemon Cake: Ascribing Religious Motivation in Administrative
Adjudications—A Comment on Masterpiece Cakeshop (Part II), YALE J. ON
REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 20, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/a-lemon-cake
-ascribing-religious-motivation-in-administrative-adjudications-a-comment-on
-Masterpiece-cakeshop-part-ii [https://perma.cc/CL3B-YQYH]; Marty Lederman, State “Hostility” to Religion Without Religious Discrimination?: The Unexpected Free Exercise Issue Lurking in Masterpiece Cakeshop, BALKINIZATION
(Dec. 19, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/12/state-hostility-to-religion
-without.html [https://perma.cc/2RXT-BWA]; Jim Oleske, Justice Gorsuch, Kippahs, and False Analogies in Masterpiece Cakeshop, TAKE CARE (June 19,
2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/justice-gorsuch-kippahs-and-false
-analogies-in-Masterpiece-cakeshop [https://perma.cc/HP2N-LW4M].
312. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 168 (“But if there was a
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evidence, instead asserting that because the immigration ban is
facially nondiscriminatory, it can pass constitutional muster regardless of the President’s statements.313 The Court’s main justification is judicial deference; immigration decisions should be
made by the President and not by the courts.314 But why the
principle of religious neutrality should apply only in some
spheres and not others is unclear. It is notable that the majority
disavows the analogy to the infamous Korematsu decision.315 The
parallels are striking, which may explain the Court’s defensiveness. In Trump, like Korematsu, the evidence of ethnic or religious hostility is overwhelming, the national security justification for the ban is weak, and the need for judicial deference is
questionable.316
It is not clear how much of the disparate results in Trump
and Masterpiece Cakeshop is unconscious religious favoritism,
though it is difficult to imagine an equivalent “Catholic ban” being upheld by a Court populated with a Catholic majority. Perhaps this is too crude. Certainly, the Court has sometimes come
to the aid of minority religions. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
City of Hialeah protected Santeria practitioners,317 and Holt v.
Hobbs was a victory for a Muslim who wanted to wear a short
beard in prison.318 But the political valence of recent Establishment Clause decisions like Town of Greece and recent RFRA
cases like Hobby Lobby suggests a rising Christian favoritism.319
There is also a developing asymmetry in free exercise exemptions. Legislatures that adopt exemptions for religious traditionalists who object to same-sex marriage are not also protecting
clear case involving religious animus this past Term, it was not Masterpiece, but
Trump v. Hawaii . . . . There has never been a case in which the Court was
presented with more evidence of religious animus on the part of a single and
final executive decisionmaker.”).
313. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018).
314. Id. at 2418–20.
315. Id. at 2423.
316. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Trump v. Hawaii: How the Supreme Court
Simultaneously Overturned and Revived Korematsu, 128 YALE L.J.F. 641
(2019); Aziz Huq, The Travel Ban Decision Echoes Some of the Worst Supreme
Court Decisions in History, VOX (June 26, 2018), https://www.vox.com/the-big
-idea/2018/6/26/17507014/travel-ban-internment-camp-supreme-court
-korematsu-muslim-history [https://perma.cc/5Y79-8UY5].
317. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
318. 574 U.S. 352 (2015).
319. Cf. Corbin, supra note 287; Tushnet, supra note 291, at 475–77.
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the views of religious believers who favor equal treatment for
those within the LGBT community.320
A significant shift in the Court’s understanding of who
counts as a “religious minority” has occurred. First, religious traditionalists, primarily white evangelical Christians, have repositioned themselves as an embattled cultural and political minority. In so doing, they have sought to sensitize the Court to
their supposed marginal—even discrete and insular—status.321
Second, religious traditionalists have taken up the language
of multiculturalism conventionally used by ethnic and racial minorities.322 Again, antiliberal theories provide ready sources of
normative and legal argument. A standard claim is that liberalism is too individualistic and cannot accommodate cultural or
group pluralism.323 The liberal state treats all associations as
voluntary and puts them on an equal footing.324 For critics, however, this account of how individuals experience social identity
formation is too detached and fails to appreciate diversity, inclusion, and the value of difference.325 Antiliberal critics complain
about cultural flattening and moral conformity, framing their arguments in terms of communal or associational pluralism.326
The result is that when an LGBT couple files an antidiscrimination complaint against a white evangelical Christian man,
the latter assumes the role of the victim. Proponents of religious
accommodation assert that the group of business owners that
will engage in LGBT discrimination is relatively small. And they
320. See Leslie Griffin, Marriage Rights and Religious Exemptions in the
United States, OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE 1, 14–15 (2017) (arguing that religious exemptions concerning same-sex marriage “threaten to re-establish religious marriage law by undermining the neutral marriage law that governs everyone equally”).
321. See Melissa Murray, Inverting Animus: Masterpiece Cakeshop and the
New Minorities, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 257, 282 (2018).
322. See id.
323. See supra Part II.C.
324. See supra Part II.C.
325. See supra Part II.C.
326. See, e.g., R.R. Reno, What Liberalism Lacks, FIRST THINGS (May 31,
2019), https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2019/05/what-liberalism
-lacks [https://perma.cc/C6QZ-LNCV] (criticizing “liberal monoculture”); cf.
JOHN D. INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM: SURVIVING AND THRIVING THROUGH
DEEP DIFFERENCE 7 (2016) (advocating for “[c]onfident pluralism [that] allows
genuine difference to coexist without suppressing or minimizing our firmly held
convictions”).
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claim that LGBT people should go elsewhere to be served for the
sake of allowing an embattled group to preserve its cultural and
religious identity.327
That the actual exercise of social, economic, and political
power in many places looks quite different does not seem to matter. Certainly, the triumph of President Trump—with his now
fulfilled promise to ban Muslims and his flirtation with white
Christian nationalism—should give us pause that we are witnessing the liberal state’s destruction of a quaint and valuable
cultural and religious minority.328
Nevertheless, animus seems to be in the eye of the beholder.
It is notable that a doctrine that has generally applied to ethnic,
racial, sexual, and religious minorities—African-Americans and
Muslims and other traditionally despised religious groups—is
deployed by the Court to protect religious conservatives against
a state enforcing a liberal norm of equal treatment. Although
antidiscrimination laws are laws of general applicability, the
Court purports to uncover animus to make an end-run around
Smith. At the same time, however, Smith’s logic of neutrality is
still available when the Justices want to enforce general laws
that have a disparate religious impact, such as the travel ban,
as long as they ignore the obvious religious hostility. When applied to Muslims, it appears that animus will be discounted or
avoided, but when applied to traditionalist Christians, it will be
magnified and made dispositive.
This inconsistency, too, can be justified by an antiliberal
view that requires the state to make a choice between competing
religious worldviews. If animus toward religious traditionalists
is already built into our liberal foundations—as antiliberal critics contend—animus doctrine itself has no foundation. The state
should instead engage in cultural defense, protecting that which

327. See Douglas Laycock & Thomas Berg, Symposium: Masterpiece
Cakeshop — Not as Narrow as May First Appear, SCOTUSBLOG (June 5, 2018,
3:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-Masterpiece
-cakeshop-not-as-narrow-as-may-first-appear [https://perma.cc/M3HQ-VZKW]
(“Should conscientious objectors to same-sex marriage be protected from participation in same-sex weddings? We still think they should, when the business is
small and personal and ample alternative providers exist (as they nearly always
do).”).
328. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Christian Legislative Prayers and Christian
Nationalism, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 453 (2019).
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is valuable and rejecting that which is not. Such a view easily
degenerates into a form of Christian preferentialism.
D. PRIVATE CHOICE
In many of the Court’s Religion Clause decisions, the principle of government neutrality is accompanied by a principle of individual choice. These are related: government is neutral among
religion, and between religion and non-religion, if private actors
are free to make choices about how monies are spent or what
religious activities to undertake. But, like the concepts of neutrality and equal treatment, the Court’s characterization of “private choice” is manipulable. The line between state action and
private decision shifts depending on how the Court characterizes
the choice architecture of a given program.
Consider four of the cases that we have been discussing: Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, Town of
Greece v. Galloway, and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. As already
noted, Zelman is the Court’s central school funding case, which
involved a voucher program in Cleveland that included religious
schools.329 The Court held that the program was valid because
the vouchers flowed to the parents of the children, and the parents made the choice of where to direct the state funds.330 Because the money did not flow directly to religious schools, but
arrived there only because of the parents’ “true private
choice[s,]” the program did not run afoul of the Establishment
Clause’s prohibition of direct funding for religious education.331
Writing in dissent, Justice Souter observed that the parents’
“choices” were quite limited.332 No suburban-area Cleveland
schools participated in the program.333 Moreover, the voucher
amounts were so low that only religious schools in the city were
realistic options for the program’s low-income students.334 In
other words, despite purportedly applying across public and private schools, the voucher program essentially subsidized only religious education.335
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 643–49 (2002).
Id. at 653–54.
Id.
Id. at 698–707 (Souter, J. dissenting).
Id. at 707.
Id. at 703–707.
Id.
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Nevertheless, in Zelman, “choice” is the “circuit breaker”
that turns the state action of government funding into the private action of parental spending.336 Trinity Lutheran, which upheld direct funding of church playground resurfacing, goes further to suggest that all government grant programs that are
structured without regard to religion or a specific religious purpose will be deemed neutral.337 Indeed, Trinity Lutheran demands that government programs not make distinctions between religious and nonreligious grantees in distributing public
funding, even if that funding will be spent in ways that subsidize
church facilities.338 On this theory, the government is not in the
business of “funding” churches, but rather is distributing funds
through grantees whose religious identification must be irrelevant as long as those grantees use the public money as authorized.339 Again, the grantee serves as a circuit breaker between
the state and the money spent.
In other words, choice turns state action into private action.
Where there is a neutral government program that distributes
public money through grantee recipients, the government is not
establishing a church even when significant funding flows directly to churches and religious organizations. Rather, the government is funding certain priorities that churches too can pursue—and in some cases, must be allowed to pursue.340
In Town of Greece, the Court made a similar move to insulate government religious speech from Establishment Clause
scrutiny. Again, choice architecture was central to the outcome
in that case, in which an upstate New York town invited religious leaders from the community to offer prayers before the
opening of town council meetings.341 The vast majority of those
prayers were Christian and explicitly sectarian in nature.342 As
the dissent observed, “[N]o one can fairly read the prayers from
336. See Laura S. Underkuffler, Vouchers and Beyond: The Individual as
Causative Agent in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 167
(2000).
337. Trinity Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024–25
(2017).
338. Id. at 2030 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
339. Id. at 2024 (majority opinion).
340. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 222, at 927–29 (discussing application of
the “circuit breaker” metaphor in Establishment Clause funding cases).
341. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
342. Id. at 1816–17.
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Greece’s Town meetings as anything other than explicitly Christian—constantly and exclusively so.”343 The vast majority of
prayers offered over a decade invoked “Jesus Christ,” references
to Christian scripture, and other sectarian language.344
The Court, however, held that the choice to give such prayers was not attributable to the government, which had merely
established the procedure by which local religious leaders were
invited to participate.345 That procedure excluded most nonChristian religious groups, a result that Justice Alito dismissed
as a mistake attributable to the inexperience of local government
officials.346 As long as the procedure for picking religious denominations was “neutral,” the religious leaders themselves could
not be told what kinds of prayers to offer.347 Despite the fact that
the prayers were given at the invitation of the town, on behalf of
the town council, and in public session, the Court treated them
as private speech. Indeed, the Court held that the government
could not limit the ministers’ prayers without likely running
afoul of speech and religious freedom guarantees.348 Like the
vouchers at issue in Zelman, the “public” taint of the prayers was
washed clean by the intervention of the religious leaders, who
were—according to the Court—speaking for themselves.349
Notably, choice architecture does not work in the opposite
direction. In Hobby Lobby, the government argued that requiring employers to include contraceptive coverage in their employee health care plans did not implicate those employers, who
would not be making the decision whether to use services covered under those plans.350 The employer’s role was limited to deciding whether to provide a health plan. If it did so, the health
plan had to include certain services, which the employee could
343. Id. at 1848 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 1821–22 (majority opinion).
346. Id. at 1830–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
347. Id. at 1822–23 (majority opinion) (“Once it invites prayer into the public
sphere, government must permit a prayer giver to address his or her own God
or gods as conscience dictates, unfettered by what an administrator or judge
considers to be nonsectarian.”).
348. Id. at 1822.
349. See id. at 1821–22, 1826.
350. Brief for the Petitioners at 33–34, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
573 U.S. 682 (2014) (No. 13-354), 2014 WL 173486, at *33–34 (relying, in part,
on Zelman to raise an attenuation objection to Hobby Lobby’s claim of substantial burden under RFRA).
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decide to use or not. The employer was not required to provide
the services directly. The insurance plan covered a range of services, and the employee would make the medical purchase.351
The employee’s spending of money was, therefore, not attributable to the employer. After all, if an employee cashed her weekly
paycheck and spent some of it on contraceptives, the employer
would not be responsible.352 This is the concept of attenuation.353
The Hobby Lobby Court, however, viewed the mandate as a
compulsion and accepted the company’s argument that it was
morally implicated in its employees’ decisions to use contraception—that the company itself was complicit in a religiously objectionable practice.354 Note how the taxpayers in Zelman and
Trinity Lutheran and the citizens in Town of Greece are not afforded the same deference. In Zelman and Trinity Lutheran, taxpayer monies subsidize the church mission, but the fact that the
money is being directed by private parties means that the taxpayers cannot complain. So, too, though sectarian prayers are
being said at a town council meeting, those prayers are insulated
from Establishment Clause scrutiny because they are not attributable to the town or its citizens.
Complicity is a morally and philosophically difficult concept.355 The Court is loath to question the sincerity of religious
claimants’ asserted beliefs.356 But on the Establishment Clause
351. Id.
352. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens: How Courts May
(and Why They Must) Judge Burdens on Religion Under RFRA, 85 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 94, 146 (2017).
353. See Kent Greenawalt, Hobby Lobby: Its Flawed Interpretive Techniques
and Standards of Application, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,
supra note 133, at 125, 140–41 (criticizing the Court’s treatment of the substantial burden issue in Hobby Lobby for inadequately responding to the problem of
attenuation).
354. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 724–27 (2014) (rejecting the government’s attenuation argument against the existence of a substantial burden for purpose
of applying RFRA).
355. We recognize, of course, that there are complex questions lurking here
about how compelled subsidies, whether through mandates or other forms of
regulation and taxation, are related to matters of speech and conscience. See
Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 VA. L. REV. 317 (2011);
Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for Religious Exemptions in Hobby Lobby’s Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1897 (2015); Nomi M.
Stolzenberg, It’s About Money: The Fundamental Contradiction of Hobby Lobby,
88 S. CAL. L. REV. 727 (2015).
356. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 717–18.
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side, citizens’ sincere religious or moral objections to funding
churches or government religious speech are given little credence once the formalities of “neutral choice” are in place. On the
free exercise side, by contrast, the distance between the religiously objectionable practice and the claimant’s participation in
that practice does not seem to matter. Government compulsion
is always present even if decisions to engage in an objectionable
practice are made by intermediaries.
The sensitivity with which the Court approaches complicity
claims concerning free exercise is not matched by a similar sensitivity under the Establishment Clause. Procedures that put
distance between money or speech through the mechanism of individual choice only function in one direction. State action can
be turned into private action, immune from Establishment
Clause scrutiny, while private action can be turned into state
compulsion, requiring exemptions.
This asymmetry raises a puzzle. Antiliberals regularly criticize the overweening social welfare state, arguing that the postNew Deal state is too controlling, destructive of private individual and associational life. But this anti-statism is selective.
While some religious accommodationists refuse both the state’s
money and its regulation, others seem content to accept the former while rejecting the latter. Freedom-enabling “choice” is the
procedural device that justifies this inconsistency, but it imposes
no meaningful constraint. Instead, the Court is drawing a public/private distinction that implicates the state only when the
state acts in ways contrary to the interests of those seeking government support for religion.
Thus, in the Court’s emerging doctrine, individual “choice”
becomes a mechanism for promoting religion. At some point,
choice becomes so diluted that it ceases to mask the actual ends
of the various policies at issue: prayer at town council meetings,
deregulatory exemptions for religious employers, funding for religious schools. If the state’s preferred religious priorities are always advanced by choice, one has to question what work the concept is doing.
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IV. THE FUTURE OF CHURCH AND STATE
When doctrine collapses, what replaces it? Law is not autonomous; it is, in part, the function of social norms and conceptions
of what is morally and politically possible. The constitutional
doctrine of church and state is particularly fluid, as it seems to
reflect, perhaps more than some other doctrinal areas, the political moment in which it is developed.357
Importantly for our purposes is what the present-day confluence of antiliberal theory and antiliberal politics portends for
the development of the Court’s church-state jurisprudence. As
we have argued, equal treatment, neutrality, non-discrimination, animus, and private choice—in short, the language of liberal principles—continue to be dominant in Religion Clause adjudication. That language, however, is losing its meaning at a
moment when liberalism is under sustained attack.358
Theory and politics are related. Liberalism’s critics are
fairly candid about their doctrinal and policy aims. And history
teaches that the Court’s understanding of principles like neutrality or equal treatment can be understood in political terms.
For antiliberals, liberalism’s religious nature means that liberal

357. We have arrived at a historical-political moment in which the Court has
legitimated the anti-Muslim initiative of a President who has expressed himself
through clear and unrelenting tropes of religious and racial bigotry. See
Moustafa Bayoumi, The Muslim Ban Ruling Legitimates Trump’s Bigotry,
GUARDIAN (June 27, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2018/jun/27/muslim-ban-ruling-trumps-bigotry [https://perma
.cc/XXW7-L6JR]; see also Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 168 n.215
(collecting judicial opinions describing President Trump’s anti-Muslim animus);
David Leonhardt & Ian Prasad Philbrick, Donald Trump’s Racism: The Definitive List, Updated, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2018/01/15/opinion/1410eonhardt-trump-racist.html
[https://perma.cc/JY67-XBLZ] (compiling “a definitive list of [Trump’s] racist
comments – or at least the publicly known ones”). In the same opinion that formally rejected the racism of Korematsu, the Court asserted that it could not
check the President’s action, even if some of the Justices wished that the President would speak in more inclusive and polite tones. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138
S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“There are numerous instances in which the statements and actions of Government officials are not
subject to judicial scrutiny or intervention. That does not mean those officials
are free to disregard the Constitution and the rights it proclaims and protects.”).
358. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S.
Ct. 1719, 1734 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); see also Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 143–46.

2020]

RELIGIOUS ANTILIBERALISM

1411

terminology should and must be reconfigured. We may be witnessing a terminological change akin to the shift from Lochnerian equal treatment to equal protection after Brown v. Board
of Education.359
The rationale and rhetoric of the new church-state doctrine
is already being formulated. It holds both that religion should be
specially protected and also that government religious expression and justification is no different from secular expression and
justification. It includes the following set of claims:
(1) Religious freedom is the first freedom. Because freedom
of religion precedes other freedoms, the protection of religious
freedom cannot be weighed against harms from lifting regulatory burdens, even those regulatory burdens that are meant to
enforce others’ basic rights.360
(2) The state already funds competing conceptions of the
good. To be consistent it must fund religious conceptions as well.
The refusal to fund pervasively sectarian schools was historically anti-Catholic and continues to be suspect for that reason.361
(3) The state already expresses support for competing conceptions of the good. To be consistent, it must be allowed to express support for religious conceptions as well.362
(4) The state already justifies laws, including coercive regulations, on the basis of controversial secular reasons. To be consistent, it must be allowed to justify laws and to coerce religious
minorities and nonbelievers on the basis of controversial religious reasons.363

359. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938).
360. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, Do Discretionary Religious Exemptions Violate the Establishment Clause?, 106 KY. L.J. 603 (2018).
361. See, e.g., Calabresi & Salander, supra note 271, at 1024–25.
362. In recent litigation over the Bladensburg Cross, the petitioners made a
version of this argument to the Court. See Brief for the American Legion Petitioners at 14, Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (No.
17-1717) (“[T]he endorsement test grants a heckler’s veto over speech supportive of religion that does not apply to any other form of government speech. Restricting only religious speech singles out religious speech for discriminatory
treatment and burdens that speech based on its content and viewpoint . . . .”).
363. See sources cited supra notes 83 and 227. While the new church-state
doctrine may not go so far as to permit the state to coerce religious practice or
ritual, it likely would permit religiously-motivated laws that regulate acts or
behaviors that are closely related to one’s philosophical or religious views. With-
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What story can we tell about the political circumstances that
have given rise to these kinds of claims and the doctrine that
follows? One possible narrative asserts that increasing pluralism coupled with rising religious non-affiliation means that a return to a more assertive public cultural Christianity is unlikely.364 Pluralism also means that the Catholic-Protestant
conflicts that shaped the no-funding debates in the mid-twentieth century are likely to be less strident, with non-preferential
funding of the religious mission becoming less objectionable.365
The terrain of the religious culture wars, however, continues
to shift in unexpected directions. First, partly in response to the
sexual revolution and the more recent recognition of LGBT
rights, evangelicals, conservative Catholics, and other religious
traditionalists have joined forces to defend a conception of religious liberty that they perceive to be under existential threat.366
Second, the backlash against Muslim and other forms of ethnic
migration has fueled the rise of Christian nationalism across
western societies, including in the United States.367 These phenomena have created fertile ground for an antiliberal revival,
which in turn sets up the jurisprudential and political possibility
for a more explicit and systematic regime of religious preferentialism. Instead of dampening the aggressive assertion of Christian nationalism in the United States, pluralism may in fact be
inducing it. We may be entering a reactionary period in the
Court’s church-state jurisprudence.
A. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
In thinking about the future trajectory of Religion Clause
doctrine, we should start briefly by restating the standard account of its recent past. In their Political History of the Establishment Clause, John Jeffries and James Ryan describe a coalitional shift beginning in the 1970s and 1980s.368 That shift
changed the jurisprudential politics of state support for religion,
particularly in the education context where battles between
out a secular purpose requirement, which has been heavily criticized by religious conservatives, the state would be permitted to adopt coercive laws justified solely on religious grounds.
364. See infra Part IV.A.
365. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at 367–68.
366. See infra Part IV.B.1.
367. See infra Part IV.B.2.
368. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at 327–52.
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Catholics and Protestants had been most protracted.369 Previously, Protestants of all denominations were wary of state support because they opposed aid to Catholic parochial schools. The
Court’s no-aid decisions, which began with Everson v. Board of
Education in 1947 (the first modern Establishment Clause case)
reflected this dominant view.370 The no-aid principle roughly coexisted with a movement to eliminate religious observance in the
public schools, which was embraced by the Court in the school
prayer decisions of the early 1960s.371 Jews, Catholics, and secularists had been demanding the end to Protestant bible readings in public schools at least since the late 1800’s when cities
with large Catholic populations eliminated readings from the
King James Bible.372
Jeffries and Ryan argue that two occurrences have led to the
withering of the no-aid position, even as the no-prayer consensus
remains firm. First, white, southern Protestants, reacting to desegregation mandates following Brown v. Board of Education,
retreated to private Christian academies as a means of avoiding
integration. Their withdrawal from secular public schools and
their desire for financial support for their new private schools
moved mainly southern Protestants “to rethink their traditional
opposition to aid to religious schools.”373 Second, and relatedly,
as anti-Catholic animosity faded, American Protestantism became increasingly divided.374 Mainline, northern, and racially
progressive Protestantism found itself much more aligned with
public secularists, while evangelical, fundamentalist, and
mainly southern Protestants found themselves agreeing with
conservative Catholics across a range of social issues.375
The evangelicalization of the Republican Party is a crucial
part of this story. Roe v. Wade was decided in 1973,376 but it was
a decision by the IRS in 1975 to deny tax exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools—eventually affirmed by

369. See id.
370. 330 U.S. 1, 8–17 (1947).
371. See Abington Sch. Dist. V. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
372. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at 305–27.
373. Id. at 283.
374. Id. at 282.
375. Id.
376. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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the Court in Bob Jones University v. United States377—that accelerated the Christian right’s mobilization.378 In any case, religious conservatives, especially in the South, were already an obvious national political force by Ronald Reagan’s election in
1980.379 They led the political and cultural backlash to abortion,
contraception, women’s sexual liberation, and LGBT rights.380
Running against a “liberal” Supreme Court, the Republican
Party has repeatedly echoed these concerns.381 Since Reagan, it
has endorsed the goal of returning prayer to the schools and
providing large-scale financial assistance for private religious
schools.382 The Court’s recent decisions certainly open the door
to the latter. The no-aid principle has moved quickly toward a
compulsory aid principle.
Jeffries and Ryan’s narrative focuses on Establishment
Clause cases, especially as related to schools.383 They have less
to say about the cultural conflicts over public religious expression or religious exemptions. Both are in significant flux. Disputes over public religious displays outside of schools have been
relatively constant since the 1980s. Prior to Town of Greece, the
most recent decision on public religious expression came in 2005
with a pair of Ten Commandments cases that pointed in the opposite direction—one upholding a public monument and one
striking down a government-sponsored display.384
Notably, the religious coalition that found common cause
with the Republican Party in the 1960s and 1970s was not par-

377. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
378. See Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment
Clause, 89 TEX. L. REV. 583, 637–39 (2011).
379. See BARRY HANKINS, AMERICAN EVANGELICALS: A CONTEMPORARY
HISTORY OF A MAINSTREAM RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT 147–48 (2008); ALLEN D.
HERTZKE, REPRESENTING GOD IN WASHINGTON 5 (1988).
380. Schragger, supra note 378, at 606–10.
381. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2544–52.
382. See REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016, at
12, 34 (2016), https://prod-static-ngop-pbl.s3.amazonaws.com/media/
documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL[1]-ben_1468872234.pdf [https://perma.cc/ME25
-ZJ43].
383. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at 281–84.
384. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (upholding Ten Commandments display); McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (rejecting
Ten Commandments display).
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ticularly interested in free exercise exemptions. Sherbert v. Verner,385 the case that first applied heightened review to a generally applicable law burdening religious exercise, was decided in
1963 without much fanfare.386 Wisconsin v. Yoder, decided in
1972, held that the Old Order Amish need not comply with a
state law that required children below the age of sixteen to attend school.387 Yoder remains the high-water mark for judicially
mandated religious exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment.
It was only after the Supreme Court decided Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith388
in 1990 that a broad coalition of liberals and conservatives raised
concerns about the judicial approach to free exercise. Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion in Smith was joined by most of his fellow conservatives. Justice Kennedy was in the majority. Justice
O’Connor, a relative moderate, dissented from Justice Scalia’s
reasoning but concurred in the judgment.389 Yet the political response was swift and unified. In a strong showing of bipartisanship, and with near unanimity, Congress passed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, which President Clinton signed into
law in 1993.390 RFRA reinstated the compelling interest test that
the Court had applied in Sherbert and Yoder.391 Supported by
the ACLU and the Southern Baptist Convention and everyone
in-between, it represented a brief moment of political consensus
in matters of religious freedom.392
B. RISE OF ANTILIBERAL POLITICS
Writing in 2001, Jeffries and Ryan predicted the Supreme
Court’s 2002 decision in Zelman v. Harris, though they did not
anticipate the Court moving so quickly from a no-aid position to

385. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
386. See De’Siree N. Reeves, Missing Link: The Origin of Sherbert and the
Irony of Religious Equality, 15 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 201 (2019).
387. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
388. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
389. Id. at 892–908.
390. See Martin S. Lederman, Reconstructing RFRA: The Contested Legacy
of Religious Freedom Restoration, 125 YALE L.J.F. 416, 416 (2016); see also
Schragger, supra note 378, at 608–09.
391. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012).
392. See Lupu, supra note 248, at 54–55.
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compulsory aid in Trinity Lutheran.393 They also predicted that
America’s increasing religious pluralism would prevent a return
to school prayer and the embrace of a more aggressive public
Christianity.394
Both of these predictions turn on a similar narrative of religious pluralism, a story of how the Protestant-Catholic tensions
of a prior era gave way to a panoply of religious groups—some
Christian, some not—seeking and receiving government aid. In
a highly pluralistic environment, religious groups receiving government funding might seem no more threatening than when
nonreligious groups receive it. At the same time, pluralism
works against school prayer or other forms of public religious expression. The multiplicity of religious views in society makes religious preferentialism particularly problematic.
Jeffries and Ryan’s story ends a bit too soon, however. Writing today, one would have to place the debate over free exercise
exemptions at the center of any account of the political economy
of church and state. Moreover, one might not be as certain about
the effects of pluralism on judicial decisions regarding school
prayer or other forms of public religious expression. Two developments have destabilized church-state politics in the United
States since the turn of the twenty-first century. The first is the
resurgent conservative backlash against the sexual revolution
with its increasingly militant opposition to abortion, contraception, and the LGBT civil rights movement.395 The second is the
global response to Islamic fundamentalism, with its concomitant
backlash against immigration and the rise of Christian nationalism.396

393. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at 367.
394. Id. at 367–68.
395. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2544–52.
396. See Richard C. Schragger, The Politics of Free Exercise After Employment Division v. Smith: Same-Sex Marriage, the “War on Terror,” and Religious
Freedom, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2009 (2011).
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1. The Sexual Revolution and LGBT Backlash
Abortion politics obviously play a role in Jeffries and Ryan’s
political economy of the Religion Clauses, but it is a relatively
minor one. Their account focuses on the funding of private religious schools. At the time of their writing, the relative solidity of
Roe v. Wade397 was in some ways taken for granted.
The political union of religious conservatives has only grown
stronger in the last two decades, however. One flashpoint has
been the inclusion of contraception as part of mandatory health
insurance coverage under the Affordable Care Act (ACA).398 The
ACA encountered significant political resistance, including from
those with traditional religious views. That resistance met with
success in the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, which
read RFRA expansively in granting exemptions to large forprofit corporations.399 The Trump administration has granted
further exemptions to religious and nonreligious employers who
object to providing contraceptive coverage,400 as well as to health
care workers with conscientious objections to participating in a
wide range of medical practices.401
In addition, the appointment of Justice Kavanaugh to the
Supreme Court has given anti-abortion forces greater optimism
about overturning Roe.402 At least nine states have recently
adopted laws criminalizing abortion—at least six without a rape

397. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
398. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
399. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
400. See Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 930 F.3d 543 (3d Cir. 2019) (upholding nationwide injunction blocking Trump Administration regulations expanding religious exemptions to the Affordable Care Act); Religious Exemptions
and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the
Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792 (Oct. 13, 2017).
401. Margot Sanger-Katz, Trump Administration Strengthens “Conscience
Rule” for Health Care Providers, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2019), https://www
.nytimes.com/2019/05/02/upshot/conscience-rule-trump-religious-exemption
-health-care.html [https://perma.cc/489K-7NL6].
402. See, e.g., David Crary, States Pushing Near-Bans on Abortion, Targeting Roe v. Wade, AP NEWS (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/
3a9b3bc0e14d47aa8691aca84c32f391 [https://perma.cc/89QP-RV39]; K.K. Rebecca Lai, Abortion Bans: 9 States Have Passed Bills To Limit the Procedure
This Year, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2019/us/abortion-laws-states.html [https://perma.cc/D9R5-6MXU].
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or incest exception403—in anticipation that the Supreme Court
will use such laws as vehicles to reverse decades of precedent.
Increasingly, anti-abortion and anti-contraception politics
are linked. A consistent trope of religious antiliberalism is the
identification of sexual licentiousness with liberalism.404 An example is the association of liberalism with paganism and the association of paganism with the sexual rituals and mores of pagans.405 The conservative resistance to sexual liberation has
been constant, but its more recent formulations sometimes
equate sexual autonomy and reproductive rights with the larger
demographic implosion of Western civilization—the problem of
low birth rates for “native whites.”406
Conservative hostility toward sexual autonomy is also reflected in opposition to the LGBT civil rights struggle. The campaign for LGBT marriage equality, culminating in the Court’s
decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,407 has produced a political backlash from religious traditionalists, further cementing the existing counter-cultural alliance of conservative Catholics, evangelicals, fundamentalist Christians, and other conservative
religious denominations. As Masterpiece Cakeshop illustrates,
the demand for religious exemptions from laws mandating equal
treatment of LGBT people has become a central point of conflict.408 The response to LGBT rights is shaping, and in many
ways distorting, the law of free exercise.409 It has engendered a
divisive politics very different from the politics that existed when
RFRA was passed by a virtually unanimous Congress.
403. See, e.g., Mara Gordon & Alyson Hurt, Early Abortion Bans: Which
States Have Passed Them?, NPR NEWS (June 5, 2019), https://www.npr.org/
sections/health-shots/2019/06/05/729753903/early-abortion-bans-which-states
-have-passed-them [https://perma.cc/WKC3-KP2B].
404. See supra Part II.
405. See SMITH, supra note 10, at 285–89.
406. See, e.g., PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, THE DEATH OF THE WEST: HOW DYING
POPULATIONS AND IMMIGRANT INVASIONS IMPERIL OUR COUNTRY AND CIVILIZATION (2002).
407. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
408. See RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, LGBT RIGHTS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMON GROUND (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2019);
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS (Douglas
Laycock et al. eds., 2008).
409. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 146 (arguing that the
Masterpiece Court distorted animus doctrine in holding that the state violated
the principle of religious neutrality).
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Obergefell itself rejected a legal disability on LGBT people
that could only be justified on the basis of religious beliefs.410 At
the oral argument in the Supreme Court, as in lower courts, the
states struggled to justify marriage exclusion in terms that all
citizens could reasonably accept.411 Their theory that expanding
civil marriage would weaken a conception of marriage linked to
procreation, and thereby lead opposite-sex couples to remain unmarried, was nonsensical. In this way, Obergefell represents a
significant step in the broader liberal project; it rejects reliance
on religious reasons for lawmaking, no matter how widely
shared.412 Obergefell is also continuous with the general civil
rights project, the expansion of equal treatment to once-marginalized persons.
For both these reasons, the counter-cultural reaction to
Obergefell has been fairly intense, with religious traditionalists
arguing that Obergefell represents the end of religious freedom,
a central effort by the state to stamp out dissenting voices from
the liberal orthodoxy. When advocates of LGBT rights counter
that appeals to rights of religious conscience were also used to
justify racial segregation and discrimination, those seeking religious exemptions to equal treatment guarantees insist that
LGBT rights differ from African-American civil rights.413 Most
410. See Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe, Obergefell and the End of Religious Reasons for Lawmaking, RELIGION & POL. (June
29, 2015), https://religionandpolitics.org/2015/06/29/obergefell-and-the-end-of
-religious-reasons-for-lawmaking/ [https://perma.cc/DQ8D-NTKV].
411. Id.
412. But see Gregg Strauss, What’s Wrong with Obergefell, 40 CARDOZO L.
REV. 631 (2018) (arguing that while Obergefell rejected appeals to religious reasons, it nevertheless relied improperly on secular nonpublic reasons in violation
of the demands of a liberal principle of legitimacy).
413. Douglas Laycock, The Campaign Against Religious Liberty, in RISE OF
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 133, at 231, 252; Steven D. Smith,
Against “Civil Rights” Simplism: How Not To Accommodate Compelling Legal
Commitments, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, LGBT RIGHTS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR
COMMON GROUND, supra note 408, at 233; Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of
Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the Healthcare Context, in
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra
note 408, at 77, 101. But see Carlos A. Ball, Against LGBT Exceptionalism in
Religious Exemptions from Antidiscrimination Obligations, 31 J.C.R. & ECON.
DEV. 233, 239–42 (2018) (“[T]here is no good reason, in the context of LGBT
issues, to depart in significant ways from how anti-discrimination law has in
the past accommodated religious dissenters in the context of race and gender.”);
Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 160–61 (criticizing rejections of the
race analogy in the context of religious exemptions).

1420

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:1341

concede that racial discrimination is beyond the pale no matter
its religious provenance. But some argue that opposition to
same-sex marriage is both a religious belief that is worthy of respect and a legitimate basis for denying LGBT persons equal
treatment.414 The latter move undercuts the equal rights project
itself, for it permits public-facing discrimination despite the serious harm it causes: the elimination of equal citizenship rights
that are the basis for LGBT participation in the political and economic life of the nation.415
The backlash to Obergefell raises some questions about the
application of the pluralist account of twentieth century churchstate politics. Protestant-Catholic conflict characterized the midtwentieth century church-state equilibrium. But in the twentyfirst century, the conflict is between religious traditionalists and
progressives, both secular or religious. Religious traditionalists
reject the notion that same-sex marriage does not implicate their
way of life. They argue that Obergefell represents a liberal conception of family, marriage, sex, procreation, and sexuality that
is imposed directly upon them and in ways they cannot avoid.
For LGBT persons seeking equal rights, meanwhile, pluralism is only plausible on equal terms. Lending judicial legitimacy
to the refusal to provide equal services in the marketplace marks
LGBT people as permanently second-class. Religious pluralism
does not solve this seeming zero-sum battle. Multiplicity—religious, ethnic, sexual or otherwise—cannot mute the on-going
fight for recognition. It is partly for this reason that the political
consensus that led to RFRA’s passage has fragmented and cannot be recovered today.
2. Islamophobia
A similar zero-sum fight seems to characterize the Western
reaction to fundamentalist Islam—the second feature of twentyfirst century church-state politics. Global church-state politics
has had an increasingly ethno-religious cast. Consider European
countries that have banned the hijab or the building of minarets
414. See Laycock, supra note 413, at 242–46.
415. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 158–60 (criticizing the
claim advanced by the plaintiff in Masterpiece that dignitary harms are not
compelling interests for purposes of upholding civil rights laws against free exercise challenge); Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Religious Exemptions and
Antidiscrimination Law in Masterpiece Cakeshop, 128 YALE L.J.F. 201, 214–15
(2018); Sager & Tebbe, supra note 269.
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or have reasserted the need and value of Christian symbols, like
the cross, in public places.416 Consider, more pointedly, countries
like Hungary and Poland that are promoting the practices and
institutions of an ethno-religious state. There, opposition to Islam has become a defining characteristic of religious, ethnic, and
political identity. Islamophobia has been accompanied by a resurgence of Christian nativism.417
Left- and right-leaning commentators point to the rising tide
of nationalist and reactionary politics as an indication of the crisis of liberalism.418 Some argue that the failure of Western religious toleration suggests a serious blindness at the center of the
liberal project. That blindness manifests as an inability to come
to terms with illiberal religions in general and especially with
Islam as it is practiced in the West. On the left, critics point out
the hypocrisy of Western nations that preach toleration but
adopt policies of exclusion and denigration.419 On the right, mass
Muslim immigration to the West is used to justify support for
more robust Christian societies, with conservatives and antiliberals arguing that Christian national identity must be asserted more forcefully to counter the rise of Islam.420
This latter impulse suggests how the Jeffries and Ryan pluralism thesis might be mistaken. Indeed, it suggests how an increase in Western religious pluralism might lead to more public

416. See CÉCILE LABORDE, CRITICAL REPUBLICANISM: THE HIJAB CONTROPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2008); David Miller, Majorities and Minarets: Religious Freedom and Public Space, 46 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 437 (2016).
417. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
418. But cf. Samuel Scheffler, The Rawlsian Diagnosis of Donald Trump,
BOS. REV. (2019) http://bostonreview.net/politics-philosophy-religion/samuel
-scheffler-rawlsian-diagnosis-donald-trump [https://perma.cc/S8QU-4NNX] (arguing that “Trump’s success vindicates rather than undermines liberal theory”).
419. See Susanna Mancini, The Tempting of Europe, the Political Seduction
of the Cross: A Schmittian Reading of Christianity and Islam in European Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONAL SECULARISM IN AN AGE OF RELIGIOUS REVIVAL 111–35 (Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld eds., 2014).
420. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER CALDWELL, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION
IN EUROPE: IMMIGRATION, ISLAM, AND THE WEST (2009); DOUGLAS MURRAY,
THE STRANGE DEATH OF EUROPE: IMMIGRATION, IDENTITY, ISLAM 1, 3 (2018)
(claiming that Europe is “committing suicide” through mass migration and has
lost faith in “its beliefs, traditions, and legitimacy”); see also Robert Duncan,
Limiting Muslims Is Patriotic, U.S. Cardinal Says, NAT’L CATH. REP. (May 20,
2019), https://www.ncronline.org/news/politics/limiting-muslim-immigration
-patriotic-us-cardinal-says [https://perma.cc/DJY7-9UQP].
VERSY AND
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religiosity and private suppression rather than less. The perceived Islamic threat leads to calls to ban religious sites, outlaw
Islamic law, enforce restrictions on religious dress, or require
outward assertions of fealty to Christian symbols.421 Instead of
resulting in less public support for official displays of Christianity, existing forms of pluralism have produced a popular backlash in the form of a more full-throated defense of Christian (or
“Judeo-Christian”) values and a concomitant reassertion of those
values in public, up to and including coercing compliance with
traditionalist norms.
President Trump’s Muslim ban represents this assertion of
Christian nationalism,422 in parallel with the practices of rightwing parties throughout Europe to restrict or eliminate immigration from the Middle East and to shut the door to Muslim
refugees and asylum seekers. Controlling entry is a way of shortcircuiting ethnic and religious pluralism and is part of a larger
explicit agenda—now fully embraced by the Republican Party—
of preserving an imagined American identity in the face of perceived ethnic and religious attack.
Anti-immigrant nativism has a long history, in the United
States as elsewhere. In a previous century, it was mainly antiCatholic but also anti-Jewish.423 Jeffries and Ryan are correct
that the Protestant reaction to Catholicism and to desegregation
played an important role in the Supreme Court’s approach to the
Establishment Clause. In the twenty-first century, we are already witnessing the effect of anti-Islamic nativism in shaping
church-state doctrine at the Court.424
421. See, e.g., Nick Cumming-Bruce & Steven Erlanger, Swiss Ban Building
of Minarets on Mosques, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2009), https://www.nytimes
.com/2009/11/30/world/europe/30swiss.html [https://perma.cc/34PY-LXDB];
Swathi Shanmugasundaram, Anti-Sharia Law Bills in the United States, S.
POVERTY L. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2018/
02/05/anti-sharia-law-bills-united-states [https://perma.cc/VAX2-G3Y3]; Liam
Stack, Burqa Bans: Which Countries Outlaw Face Coverings?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/world/europe/quebec-burqa-ban
-europe.html [https://perma.cc/R5AR-YKDQ].
422. See Corbin, supra note 328, at 472–73.
423. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at 281–82.
424. In addition to the Muslim ban, consider the Court’s recent rejection of
an Islamic prisoner’s Establishment Clause challenge to Alabama’s practice of
allowing only Christian clergy to administer last rites within an execution
chamber. See Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661 (2019) (mem.) (vacating stay of execution despite prisoner’s claim that the state had violated his First Amendment
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C. THE COLLAPSE OF SEPARATIONISM
What is the relationship between antiliberal theory and illiberal politics? Religious antiliberals need not embrace nativism
or Trumpian populism. Indeed, antiliberals often blame liberalism for the rise of authoritarian regimes. Whether antiliberal
theory nevertheless exhibits an historical affinity with authoritarianism or has the capacity to counter authoritarian regimes
are questions that we cannot address here.425
What we can say is that in the context of American churchstate politics, left and right antiliberal theories point away from
the mid-twentieth century separationist settlement.426 Moreover, as exhibited in the United States, religious antiliberalism
tends to be socially conservative.427 Much of the new antiliberalism advocates a church-state doctrine that involves: (1) broad
autonomy for religious institutions and persons through robust
religious exemptions from general laws; (2) public funding of
churches and religious organizations through vouchers or direct
grants on par with secular institutions; (3) acceptance of majoritarian public religious expression and displays, including in
some cases, a return to school prayer; and (4) the legitimacy of
state-enforced moral codes based on religious principles.428
This set of commitments reflects a socially conservative political program. To the extent critiques of liberalism are associated with a certain form of mid-twentieth century church-state
separationism, this program is also a challenge to liberalism. Antiliberal theory is a resource and justification for rejecting core
aspects of Religion Clause jurisprudence.
The doctrine has already shifted, as we have argued. And
the composition of the Supreme Court matters. Justices Alito
and Gorsuch are undoubtedly aware of the deep critiques of liberalism; they have been a staple of conservative intellectual discourse for a generation. And with the addition of Justice Kavanaugh, it seems likely there will be five votes for an expansive

rights by excluding Muslim clergy).
425. But see HOLMES, supra note 7, at 18–21; ZEEV STERNHELL ET AL., THE
BIRTH OF FASCIST IDEOLOGY (David Maisel trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1994)
(1989).
426. See supra Part II.
427. Supra Parts II.B–D.
428. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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reading of RFRA and Masterpiece Cakeshop’s free exercise holding. Under either theory, religious individuals, groups, and corporations will be entitled to exemptions from a whole panoply of
federal and state laws, including civil rights laws. It also seems
likely that Trinity Lutheran will be applied to many other forms
of government funding, thus embedding a doctrinal principle of
compulsory aid to churches and religious organizations on equal
terms with secular equivalents.429
And finally, it seems likely that restrictions on government
expressions of sectarian religiosity in the public sphere will be
relaxed.430 A number of Justices have already signaled their rejection of the endorsement test, with some favoring a coercionbased approach instead.431 On that account, any symbolic activity of government, as long as it falls short of coercing religious
practice, or perhaps proselytizing, would not constitute an Establishment Clause violation. Some versions of a coercion test
would permit compulsory school prayer, perhaps with an opt-out
for dissenters. With a doctrinal path cleared for state-sponsored
religious exercise, changes in public culture under such a test
could be profound.432
D. THE COMING INTRA-CONSERVATIVE DEBATE
On a majority conservative Court, the debate over church
and state will be intramural. Rhetorically, liberalism will continue to prevail. The language of neutrality, non-discrimination,
equal treatment, and animus will be deployed by the Justices
despite the increasing incoherence of those terms. The question
for the Justices is whether they can construct workable alternatives to the application of these liberal principles, which religious
antiliberals argue have been corrupt since their inception. As
power shifts rightward on the Court, the question is how far the
Court will go in dismantling the separationist regime.

429. See Morris Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Freedom from Religion
Found., 139 S. Ct. 909 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting the denial
of certiorari); Espinoza v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603 (Mont. 2018),
cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2777 (2019).
430. Cf. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2076 (2019).
431. See id. at 2098–103 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
432. See Steven G. Gey, Life After the Establishment Clause, 110 W. VA. L.
REV. 1, 42 (2007) (“[C]itizens would have to accept certain fundamental changes
in the nature of the American political system.”).
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An emerging debate on the political right is between those
who would retain some features of a basic liberal regime and
those who would jettison liberalism altogether. Those who seek
to retain a basic neutrality principle, no matter how weakly enforced, are not yet prepared to embrace a religious state, though
they sometimes will argue that such a state can meet the minimal requirements of liberal legitimacy.433 Others are not at all
concerned with liberal pieties. For antiliberals like Smith and
Vermeule, liberalism, secularism, and paganism are all opposed
to Christianity. For these thinkers, transcendent authority and
moral truth are embodied in the traditions of the Church (or,
perhaps, churches) and are respected and sustained in the religious culture of a Christian society and, if possible, a Christian
state.434 Liberalism is not a framework for fair competition, but
rather a totalizing value system that requires conformity with
its own ethics, liturgy, and rituals. The answer to liberalism is
not to demand a more modest version of it, but to uproot it entirely, or as much as possible, in favor of a perfectionist religious
society, governed by a religiously-integrated state.435
This intra-conservative debate has only recently broken
through to popular conservative media, in which religious antiliberals, or those sympathetic to them, have attacked more
mainstream religious conservatives for their continued adherence to the basic tenets of liberal democracy.436 An authoritarian
433. See, e.g., Muñoz, supra note 172; cf. Richard W. Garnett, Mild and Equitable Establishments, FIRST THINGS (Apr. 2019), https://www.firstthings.com/
article/2019/04/mild-and-equitable-establishments [https://perma.cc/BCQ5
-3Q8D].
434. See supra Parts II.B, II.D.
435. See Schwartzman & Wilson, supra note 192.
436. See Sohrab Ahmari, Against David French-ism, FIRST THINGS (May 29,
2019), https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2019/05/against-david
-french-ism [https://perma.cc/PT29-2Z3N]. Ahmari initiated a round of conservative infighting when he criticized David French, a conservative Christian
writer at the National Review, for operating within the confines of a liberal democratic order that purports to “accommodate both traditional Christianity and
the libertine ways and paganized ideology of the other side.” Id. Invoking antiliberal tropes—note his use of the Christian/pagan dichotomy—Ahmari called
on conservative Christians to treat “[c]ivility and decency [as] secondary values”
that should be “use[d] . . . to enforce our order and our orthodoxy, not [to] pretend that they could ever be neutral.” Id. French responded by defending a fusion of classical liberalism and “fundamentally Christian and Burkean conservative principles,” calling for “neutral spaces where Christians and pagans
can work side by side.” David French, What Sohrab Ahmari Gets Wrong, NAT’L
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Christian state, following the rise of “illiberal democracy” in
Hungary and Poland, seems to be the preferred model.437
The judicial debate will undoubtedly be more muted and less
radical. The disestablishment norm is simply too well entrenched. But what about a kind of quasi-Christian or “JudeoChristian” preferentialism coupled with relatively favorable
treatment of traditionalist Christians and relatively unfavorable
treatment of religious minorities, in particular, Muslims? We are
witnessing such regimes already.
There is no reason to believe that the United States is immune from the political forces that have put pressure on liberal
regimes around the world. The backlash against religious toleration and multiculturalism, along with the assertion of religious
and ethnic chauvinism, is apparent throughout Europe, in the
Islamic world, and elsewhere. A Court that has released the
brakes on such expressions may encourage such illiberal movements. It has been a challenge to protect and defend the institu-

REV. (May 30, 2019), https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/05/david-french
-response-sohrab-ahmari/ [https://perma.cc/JMQ5-GD2B].
The dispute between Ahmari and French represents the public emergence
of a conflict between mainstream American conservatives, who are committed
to at least some central features of liberalism (including the protection of basic
civil liberties), and religious antiliberals who favor an “illiberal democracy” or
an ethno-religious state. For a range of reactions to the Ahmari-French controversy, see Ross Douthat, What Are Conservatives Actually Debating?, N.Y.
TIMES (June 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/opinion/
conservatives-david-french-trump.html [https://perma.cc/G9BF-CTA5]; Alan
Jacobs, What a Clash Between Conservatives Reveals, ATLANTIC (June 3, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/conservative-christians
-need-stay-civil/590866/ [https://perma.cc/3VBG-CTEV]; Adam Serwer, The Illiberal Right Throws a Tantrum, ATLANTIC (June 14, 2019), https://www
.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/ahmari-french-orban/591697/
[https://perma.cc/UDW5-S83M]; Stephanie Slade, The New Theocrats Are Neither Conservative nor Christian, REASON (June 3, 2019), https://reason
.com/2019/06/03/the-new-theocrats-are-neither-conservative-nor-christian/
[https://perma.cc/4HAQ-QKFR].
437. See Aris Roussinos, America’s Illiberal Pretenders and Europe’s PostLiberal States, TABLET (June 7, 2019), https://www.tabletmag.com/scroll/
286052/americas-illiberal-pretenders-and-europes-post-liberal-states [https://
perma.cc/K4SD-PY4C] (“America’s right wing dissidents have constructed . . . legalistic and moral theories of the ‘rightly ordered’ societies they
hope to build. But where the intellectuals in the U.S. have theorized a future
post-liberal political order, European politicians have constructed actually existing non-liberal and increasingly illiberal states. On one side of the Atlantic,
the state is built; on the other, the justifying theory.”); Serwer, supra note 436.
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tions of political liberalism at the turn of the twenty-first century. But with the revival of religious antiliberalism, and especially virulent forms of it, liberalism will also need renewed philosophical and theoretical support as well.
V. CONCLUSION
Contemporary religious antiliberalism targets the whole of
the liberal tradition. But it has particular resonance in the arena
of church and state. Antiliberals argue that the secular/religious
divide is a false one, like the public/private distinction, and that
both are intended to and have the effect of marginalizing religious believers. Religious antiliberals contend that privatization
of religion is a distinctly Protestant imposition and that the demands of public reason alienate and discriminate against religious believers. They further argue that society is split between
two cultural forces that are equally “religious”—Christians and
pagans. Despite assertions to the contrary, they claim liberalism
imposes a suffocating uniformity of thought and belief, forcing
ever-more narrowly constrained liberties for those who reject liberal values.
Framed as a response to liberal repression, antiliberalism
comes in various forms. For some, the answer is localism, or perhaps retreat into utopian enclaves.438 And for others, the proper
response to liberalism must be the resurrection of a Christian
society and the establishment of a state subordinate to the
Church.439 These antiliberal strategies are being promulgated by
philosophers, political theorists, and legal scholars. And they are
being debated at a moment when the doctrine of church and
state is in considerable flux. It is in flux politically as the Court’s
composition shifts, and it is in flux conceptually as the doctrinal
tools that serve to justify case outcomes are losing their elasticity.
The Court will not explicitly embrace antiliberal rhetoric.
But it may be influenced by the core claims made by religious
antiliberals, who expand the range of thinkable political and legal possibilities. Either way, it is important to observe the simultaneous reemergence of an antiliberal intellectual movement
and the rise of illiberal political regimes. The latter is already
reflected in the Court’s jurisprudence of church and state, and it
438. See supra Part II.C.
439. See supra Part II.D.
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will likely be justified by the former, even while being clothed in
the language of liberal principles. We are at a moment of inflection. An emerging conservative Supreme Court arrives when
Western liberalism has shown itself to be vulnerable to populist
and authoritarian forces. Religious antiliberalism is encouraging
a cultural and political movement toward Christian preferentialism. And the constitutional doctrine of church and state in the
United States is beginning to follow.

